{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,8,16]],"date-time":"2026-08-16T16:25:13Z","timestamp":1786897513758,"version":"build-2736575974"},"posted":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"group-title":"SSRN","reference-count":12,"publisher":"Elsevier BV","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"abstract":"<jats:p>New York City's minimum pay rule for app-based restaurant delivery workers, effective December 4, 2023, raised industry-aggregate hourly pay from $5.05 in the last full pre-rule quarter to $21.49 by the end of 2025, with two scheduled cost-of-living adjustments along the way. Using the Department of Consumer and Worker Protection's public quarterly tables covering all six covered platforms across sixteen quarters, this paper documents that the floor itself worked, but platforms substituted along whichever margin the regulator left open at each stage. During the phase-in window when on-call time could be diluted, realised hourly pay sat below the statutory floor; once the rule tightened in April 2024, on-call hours collapsed by 82 percent within twelve months while trip hours stayed flat or grew. Tips per delivery fell 71 percent over the same period, driven by user-interface changes at Uber Eats and DoorDash that the regulator subsequently documented as a $554 million transfer from workers. The active workforce contracted by 32 percent while productivity rose 80 percent and total deliveries grew 31 percent. The paper proposes a framework of regulatory substitution across compensation channels as a way to read these patterns: when a wage rule targets a single channel of platform compensation, predictable substitution along the unregulated channels follows in a sequence determined by the regulatory architecture. The pay floor binds, but the pattern of platform response shows that a single-channel wage rule is incomplete without parallel attention to the other compensation channels platforms control: on-call exposure, tip facilitation, and access to the platform itself.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.6644599","type":"posted-content","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,25]],"date-time":"2026-04-25T03:11:57Z","timestamp":1777086717000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["The Floor Works, But Platforms Substitute: Industry-Aggregate Evidence on the NYC Food Delivery Minimum Pay Rule, 2022-2025 Working Paper"],"prefix":"10.2139","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0005-8477-9393","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Boon Chuan","family":"Lim","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"78","reference":[{"issue":"4","key":"ref1","first-page":"772","article-title":"Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania","volume":"84","author":"D Card","year":"1994","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"issue":"3","key":"ref2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1405","DOI":"10.1093\/qje\/qjz014","article-title":"The Effect of Minimum Wages on Low-Wage Jobs","volume":"134","author":"D Cengiz","year":"2019","journal-title":"Quarterly Journal of Economics"},{"key":"ref3","first-page":"2210","article-title":"Restaurant Delivery App Data: October-December 2024. Department of Consumer and Worker Protection, City of New York","volume":"88","author":"C Cook","year":"2021","journal-title":"Restaurant Delivery App Data: Quarterly Aggregated Tables"},{"issue":"4","key":"ref4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"945","DOI":"10.1162\/REST_a_00039","article-title":"Minimum Wage Effects Across State Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous Counties","volume":"92","author":"A Dube","year":"2010","journal-title":"Review of Economics and Statistics"},{"key":"ref5","article-title":"Optimal Defaults with Normative Ambiguity","author":"J Goldin","year":"2020","journal-title":"Review of Economics and Statistics"},{"issue":"3","key":"ref6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"705","DOI":"10.1177\/0019793917717222","article-title":"An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber's Driver-Partners in the United States","volume":"71","author":"J V Hall","year":"2018","journal-title":"ILR Review"},{"key":"ref7","author":"B C Lim","year":"2024","journal-title":"Bunching at the Floor: Minimum Pay Compliance in NYC Ride-Hail"},{"key":"ref8","author":"B C Lim","year":"2025","journal-title":"After the Floor Moved: NYC Ride-Hail Driver Pay Behaviour Following the Minimum Pay Rule Change of"},{"key":"ref9","author":"A Manning","year":"2003","journal-title":"Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets"},{"issue":"1","key":"ref10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"3","DOI":"10.1177\/0019793920922499","article-title":"Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Review","volume":"74","author":"A Manning","year":"2021","journal-title":"ILR Review"},{"key":"ref11","author":"J A Parrott","year":"2018","journal-title":"An Earnings Standard for New York City's App-based Drivers: Economic Analysis and Policy Assessment"},{"key":"ref12","author":"R H Thaler","year":"2008","journal-title":"Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness"}],"container-title":[],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,8,16]],"date-time":"2026-08-16T15:26:51Z","timestamp":1786894011000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.ssrn.com\/abstract=6644599"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"references-count":12,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2139\/ssrn.6644599","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"subtype":"preprint"}}