{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,8,14]],"date-time":"2026-08-14T20:40:52Z","timestamp":1786740052629,"version":"build-2736575974"},"posted":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"group-title":"SSRN","reference-count":0,"publisher":"Elsevier BV","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"abstract":"<jats:p>Both major stablecoin regulatory regimes-the EU's Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) and the United States' Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act-calibrate quantitative reserve and redemption obligations to primary-channel parameters: reserve-asset maturity, full reserve backing, reserve composition, and settlement-time bounds at the issuer. None calibrate to secondary-channel parameters: off-peg outflow volume per day, depth at the peg, or time-to-clear at fifty basis points below par. Using the validated Binance Vision and Bybit public-archive trade tapes for five distinct depeg events between 2022 and 2025, I show that off-peg secondary-market quote volume on a single venue ranged from $260 million to $1.4 billion in a single calendar day, with cross-stablecoin contagion volumes of $3-5 billion on the most severe event. No issuer's disclosed primary-channel redemption capacity in the matched window came close to these magnitudes. Three core findings emerge: (i) the gap between secondary-channel exit volume S\u1d48 and primary-channel redemption capacity R\u1d48 is substantially greater than one across all five events at the daily level; (ii) stress does not stay localised-depeg events trigger flightto-safety into other stablecoins, with safe-stablecoin off-peg volumes exceeding the depegging asset's own off-peg volumes by a factor of four on the UST\/Luna event; and (iii) the headline depeg floor price differs by 28 percentage points across venues on the USDe cascade day, indicating that single-venue measurement understates aggregate stress. I link each finding to specific regulatory parameters, propose two complementary supervisory expectations operating inside existing rulemaking authority-a calibrated secondary-channel depth requirement structured analogously to ETF authorisedparticipant arrangements, and a stress-test reserve add-on-and document a structural concern about the data-availability landscape: post-MiCA and post-USD\/USDC unification, dedicated price-discovery surfaces for stablecoin depeg events are being eliminated faster than measurement methodology can adapt.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.6733398","type":"posted-content","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,5,8]],"date-time":"2026-05-08T08:32:49Z","timestamp":1778229169000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["The Wrong Risk Surface: Why MiCA and GENIUS-Era Stablecoin Reserve Rules Don't Bind on the Channel Holders Actually Use"],"prefix":"10.2139","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0005-8477-9393","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Boon Chuan","family":"Lim","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"78","container-title":[],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,8,14]],"date-time":"2026-08-14T19:42:58Z","timestamp":1786736578000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.ssrn.com\/abstract=6733398"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2139\/ssrn.6733398","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"subtype":"preprint"}}