{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T19:37:30Z","timestamp":1789673850204,"version":"4.0.1"},"reference-count":1,"publisher":"Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe (CCSD)","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2014,6,19]],"date-time":"2014-06-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1403136000000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/arxiv.org\/licenses\/nonexclusive-distrib\/1.0"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100000780","name":"European Commission","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","award":["258865"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["258865"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100000780","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"abstract":"<jats:p>The design and verification of cryptographic protocols is a notoriously\ndifficult task, even in symbolic models which take an abstract view of\ncryptography. This is mainly due to the fact that protocols may interact with\nan arbitrary attacker which yields a verification problem that has several\nsources of unboundedness (size of messages, number of sessions, etc. In this\npaper, we characterize a class of protocols for which deciding security for an\nunbounded number of sessions is decidable. More precisely, we present a simple\ntransformation which maps a protocol that is secure for a bounded number of\nprotocol sessions (a decidable problem) to a protocol that is secure for an\nunbounded number of sessions. The precise number of sessions that need to be\nconsidered is a function of the security property and we show that for several\nclassical security properties a single session is sufficient. Therefore, in\nmany cases our results yields a design strategy for security protocols: (i)\ndesign a protocol intended to be secure for a {single session}; and (ii) apply\nour transformation to obtain a protocol which is secure for an unbounded number\nof sessions.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.2168\/lmcs-10(2:11)2014","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2014,11,14]],"date-time":"2014-11-14T04:40:42Z","timestamp":1415940042000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Dynamic Tags for Security Protocols"],"prefix":"10.46298","volume":"Volume 10, Issue 2","author":[{"given":"Myrto","family":"Arapinis","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"St\u00e9phanie","family":"Delaune","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Steve","family":"Kremer","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"25203","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2014,6,19]]},"reference":[{"key":"814:not-found"}],"container-title":["Logical Methods in Computer Science"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/lmcs.episciences.org\/690\/pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/lmcs.episciences.org\/690\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,4,11]],"date-time":"2023-04-11T15:53:55Z","timestamp":1681228435000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/lmcs.episciences.org\/690"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2014,6,19]]},"references-count":1,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2168\/lmcs-10(2:11)2014","relation":{"is-same-as":[{"id-type":"arxiv","id":"1405.2738","asserted-by":"subject"},{"id-type":"doi","id":"10.48550\/arXiv.1405.2738","asserted-by":"subject"}]},"ISSN":["1860-5974"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1860-5974","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2014,6,19]]},"article-number":"690"}}