{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2023,11,28]],"date-time":"2023-11-28T20:59:19Z","timestamp":1701205159210},"reference-count":20,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2014,3,12]],"date-time":"2014-03-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1394582400000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":8777,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["J. symb. log."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[1990,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>Many phrases have been used to express what are sometimes called <jats:italic>anti-realist<\/jats:italic> conceptions of truth: \u2018verifiability\u2019, \u2018knowability\u2019, \u2018rational acceptability\u2019, \u2018warranted assertability\u2019. In spite of their obvious differences, all four of these phrases have a common form; each is a cognitive attitude modified by \u2018-ability\u2019. They speak of the possibility of verification, knowledge, rational acceptance or warranted assertion. Schematically, it seems to be claimed that it is true that <jats:italic>A<\/jats:italic> if and only if it is possible that it is <jats:italic>E<\/jats:italic>'d that <jats:italic>A<\/jats:italic>, where \u2018<jats:italic>E<\/jats:italic>\u2019 is to be replaced by some cognitive verb and \u2018A\u2019 by any indicative sentence of the class to which the anti-realist conception is being claimed to apply. Since truth is redundant as a sentential operator, this boils down to the following thesis, where \u2018<jats:italic>p<\/jats:italic>\u2019 is a propositional variable and \u2018<jats:italic>M<\/jats:italic>\u2019 expresses the appropriate kind of possibility:<\/jats:p><jats:p><jats:disp-formula><jats:graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" orientation=\"portrait\" mime-subtype=\"gif\" mimetype=\"image\" position=\"float\" xlink:type=\"simple\" xlink:href=\"S002248120002658X_eqnU1\" \/><\/jats:disp-formula><\/jats:p><jats:p>(*) also formalizes views such as Putnam's: \u2018To claim a statement is true is to claim it could be justified\u2019 [11, p. 56]. It is no doubt a crude model for anti-realism, but one has to start somewhere; by seeing how and why more sophisticated versions of anti-realism differ from (*) one should be able to understand them better too. Moreover, if an anti-realist rejects the equation of truth with, say, warranted assertibility, arguing that truth is rather to be identified with the possibility of getting into a position in which one's warrant to assert somehow cannot be overturned, the form of (*) is preserved, for truth is still being identified with the <jats:italic>possibility<\/jats:italic> of something.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.2307\/2274969","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2006,5,6]],"date-time":"2006-05-06T22:33:48Z","timestamp":1146954828000},"page":"297-314","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["Two incomplete anti-realist modal epistemic logics"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"55","author":[{"given":"Timothy","family":"Williamson","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2014,3,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref001","volume-title":"The unprovability of consistency","author":"Boolos","year":"1979"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref012","first-page":"75","volume-title":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism","author":"Salmon","year":"1987"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref008","volume-title":"Logic matters","author":"Geach","year":"1972"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref004","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2026102"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref010","volume-title":"Will, freedom and power","author":"Kenny","year":"1975"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref002","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00249673"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref016","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/analys\/47.3.154"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref019","volume-title":"Realism, meaning and truth","author":"Wright","year":"1987"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref005","volume-title":"Truth and other enigmas","author":"Dummett","year":"1978"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref006","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/mind\/XCIV.376.557"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref007","first-page":"135","volume":"28","author":"Fitch","year":"1963","journal-title":"A logical analysis of some value concepts"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref011","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511625398"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref014","volume-title":"Blindspots","author":"Sorensen","year":"1988"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref015","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/mind\/XCVI.382.256"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref017","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2219707"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref018","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00247956"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref020","volume-title":"Logical studies","author":"von Wright","year":"1957"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref003","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00364686"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref009","volume-title":"A companion to modal logic","author":"Hughes","year":"1984"},{"key":"S002248120002658X_ref013","volume-title":"An essay in classical modal logic","volume":"3","author":"Segerberg","year":"1971"}],"container-title":["Journal of Symbolic Logic"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S002248120002658X","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,18]],"date-time":"2019-05-18T21:52:04Z","timestamp":1558216324000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S002248120002658X\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[1990,3]]},"references-count":20,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[1990,3]]}},"alternative-id":["S002248120002658X"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2307\/2274969","relation":{},"ISSN":["0022-4812","1943-5886"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0022-4812","type":"print"},{"value":"1943-5886","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[1990,3]]}}}