{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,8,23]],"date-time":"2022-08-23T14:32:55Z","timestamp":1661265175456},"reference-count":45,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2014,3,12]],"date-time":"2014-03-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1394582400000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":6493,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["J. symb. log."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[1996,6]]},"abstract":"My aim in this paper is to propose what seems to me a distinctive approach to set theoretic methodology. By \u2018methodology\u2019 I mean the study of the actual methods used by practitioners, the study of how these methods might be justified or reformed or extended. So, for example, when the intuitionist's philosophical analysis recommends a wholesale revision of the methods of proof used in classical mathematics, this is a piece of reformist methodology. In contrast with the intuitionist, I will focus more narrowly on the methods of contemporary set theory, and, more importantly, I will certainly recommend no sweeping reforms. Rather, I begin from the assumption that the methodologist's job is to account for set theory as it is practiced, not as some philosophy would have it be. This credo lies at the very heart of the so-called \u2018naturalism\u2019 to be described here.<\/jats:p>A philosopher looking at set theoretic practice from the outside, so to speak, might notice any number of interesting methodological questions, beginning with the intuitionist's \u2018why use classical logic?\u2019, but this sort of question is not a live issue for most practicing set theorists. One central question on which the philosopher's and the practitioner's interests converge is this: what is the status of independent statements like the continuum hypothesis (CH)? A number of large questions arise in its wake: what criteria should guide the search for new axioms? For that matter, what reasons support our adoption of the old axioms?<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.2307\/2275672","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2006,5,6]],"date-time":"2006-05-06T22:58:29Z","timestamp":1146956309000},"page":"490-514","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":19,"title":["Set theoretic naturalism"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"61","author":[{"given":"Penelope","family":"Maddy","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2014,3,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref027","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/philmat\/3.3.248"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref015","unstructured":"G\u00f6del K. , Russell's mathematical logic, 1944; reprinted in [17], pp. 119\u2013141."},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref005","volume-title":"Philosophy of Mathematics Today","author":"Burgess"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref008","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Carnap R. , Empiricism, semantics, and ontology, 1950; reprinted in [3], pp. 241\u2013257.","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139171519.013"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref023","first-page":"321","article-title":"Review of Maddy's \u2018Realism in Mathematics\u2019","volume":"89","author":"Lavine","year":"1992","journal-title":"Journal of Philosophy"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref025","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2026712"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref038","volume-title":"Pursuit of Truth","author":"Quine","year":"1990"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref012","unstructured":"Einstein A. , Remarks, 1949, in [40[, pp. 665\u2013688."},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref022","volume-title":"Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times","author":"Kline","year":"1972"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref006","first-page":"1","volume-title":"Physicalism in mathematics","author":"Burgess","year":"1990"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref003","volume-title":"Philosophy of Mathematics","author":"Benacerraf","year":"1983"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref007","first-page":"8","volume-title":"Proof, logic, and formalization","author":"Burgess","year":"1992"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref031","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0049-237X(08)71522-2"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref019","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF02394569"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref011","unstructured":"Einstein A. , Autobiographical notes, 1949, in [40], pp. 1\u201394."},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref001","volume-title":"Non-well-founded Sets","author":"Aczel","year":"1988"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref009","volume-title":"Ontology and the Vicious-Circle Principle","author":"Chihara","year":"1973"},{"key":"S0022481200017394_ref004","unstructured":"Bridgman P. 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