{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,10,31]],"date-time":"2026-10-31T19:38:46Z","timestamp":1793475526292,"version":"4.5.0"},"reference-count":21,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2013,9,2]],"date-time":"2013-09-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1378080000000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":7306,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Am Polit Sci Rev"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[1993,9]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by \u201croving bandits\u201d destroys\n                  the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or\n                  the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator\u2014a\n                  \u201cstationary bandit\u201d who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A\n                  secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to\n                  provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity.\n                  Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those\n                  assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This\n                  incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that\n                  autocracies will rarely have good economic performance for more than a generation.\n                  The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the\n                  security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.2307\/2938736","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2006,5,6]],"date-time":"2006-05-06T07:42:01Z","timestamp":1146901321000},"page":"567-576","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2137,"title":["Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"87","author":[{"given":"Mancur","family":"Olson","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Maryland"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,9,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-19","volume-title":"Collective Action: Theory and Applications","author":"Sandier","year":"1992"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-4","volume-title":"Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial\n                     Revolution","author":"DeLong","year":"1992"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1126\/science.169.3947.733"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-15","volume-title":"The Rise and Decline of Nations","author":"Olson","year":"1982"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-17","first-page":"8","article-title":"The Logic of Collective Action in Soviet-type\n                     Societies","volume":"1","author":"Olson","year":"1990","journal-title":"Journal of Soviet Nationalities"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.56021\/9780801828188"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/019251218600700205"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1964013"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.4159\/9780674041660"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-1","volume-title":"The Moral Basis of a Backward Society","author":"Banfield","year":"1958"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-3","volume-title":"The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe","author":"Clague","year":"1992"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-21","volume-title":"Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang","author":"Sheridan","year":"1966"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-6","volume-title":"The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler\n                     Peoples","author":"Hobhouse","year":"1965"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-18","volume-title":"From Communism to a Market Democracy","author":"Olson","year":"1993"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-14","volume-title":"Some Historic Variation in Property Institutions","author":"Olson","year":"1967"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/j.ctv173f01t"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/1043463191003004002"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-11","volume-title":"Growth and Structural Change","author":"North","year":"1981"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0147-5967(91)90088-B"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-7","volume-title":"The Mugaddimah","author":"Kalduhn","year":"1967"},{"key":"S0003055400100838_manual_ref-12","volume-title":"The Rise of the West","author":"North","year":"1973"}],"container-title":["American Political Science Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S0003055400100838","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,10,20]],"date-time":"2026-10-20T07:28:49Z","timestamp":1792481329000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S0003055400100838\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[1993,9]]},"references-count":21,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-print":{"date-parts":[[1993,9]]}},"alternative-id":["S0003055400100838"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2307\/2938736","relation":{},"ISSN":["0003-0554","1537-5943"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0003-0554","type":"print"},{"value":"1537-5943","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[1993,9]]}}}