{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,4,6]],"date-time":"2025-04-06T04:52:02Z","timestamp":1743915122423},"publisher-location":"California","reference-count":0,"publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,7]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>This paper considers the mechanism design problem in two-sided markets where multiple strategic buyers come with budgets to procure as much value of items\u00a0 as possible from the strategic sellers. Each seller holds an item with public value and is allowed to bid its private cost.\u00a0 Buyers could claim their budgets, not necessarily the true ones.\u00a0 The goal is to seek budget-feasible mechanisms that ensure sellers are rewarded enough payment and buyers' budgets are not exceeded.\u00a0 Our main contribution\u00a0 is a random\u00a0 mechanism\u00a0 that guarantees various desired theoretical guarantees like the budget feasibility,\u00a0 the truthfulness on the sellers' side and the buyers' side simultaneously, and constant approximation to the optimal total procured value of buyers.\u00a0<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2018\/76","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,7,5]],"date-time":"2018-07-05T01:49:10Z","timestamp":1530755350000},"page":"548-554","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["Budget-feasible Procurement Mechanisms in Two-sided Markets"],"prefix":"10.24963","author":[{"given":"Weiwei","family":"Wu","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Xiang","family":"Liu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Minming","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"10584","event":{"number":"27","sponsor":["International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization (IJCAI)"],"acronym":"IJCAI-2018","name":"Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}","start":{"date-parts":[[2018,7,13]]},"theme":"Artificial Intelligence","location":"Stockholm, Sweden","end":{"date-parts":[[2018,7,19]]}},"container-title":["Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2018,7,5]],"date-time":"2018-07-05T01:49:42Z","timestamp":1530755382000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.ijcai.org\/proceedings\/2018\/76"}},"subtitle":[],"proceedings-subject":"Artificial Intelligence Research Articles","short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2018,7]]},"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.24963\/ijcai.2018\/76","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2018,7]]}}}