{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,8,7]],"date-time":"2024-08-07T07:31:43Z","timestamp":1723015903750},"publisher-location":"California","reference-count":0,"publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,8]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We study how to maximize the broker's (expected) profit in a two-sided market, where she buys items from a set of sellers and resells them to a set of buyers. Each seller has a single item to sell and holds a private value on her item, and each buyer has a valuation function over the bundles of the sellers' items. We consider the Bayesian setting where the agents' values\/valuations are independently drawn from prior distributions, and aim at designing dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) mechanisms that are approximately optimal.\n\nProduction-cost markets, where each item has a publicly-known cost to be produced, provide a platform for us to study two-sided markets. Briefly, we show how to covert a mechanism for production-cost markets into a mechanism for the broker, whenever the former satisfies cost-monotonicity. This reduction holds even when buyers have general combinatorial valuation functions. When the buyers' valuations are additive, we generalize an existing mechanism to production-cost markets in an approximation-preserving way. We then show that the resulting mechanism is cost-monotone and thus can be converted into an 8-approximation mechanism for two-sided markets.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2019\/22","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,7,28]],"date-time":"2019-07-28T07:46:05Z","timestamp":1564299965000},"page":"151-157","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market"],"prefix":"10.24963","author":[{"given":"Jing","family":"Chen","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Computer Science, Stony Brook University, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Bo","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Computer Science, Stony Brook University, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Yingkai","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Computer Science, Northwestern University, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"10584","event":{"number":"28","sponsor":["International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization (IJCAI)"],"acronym":"IJCAI-2019","name":"Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}","start":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,10]]},"theme":"Artificial Intelligence","location":"Macao, China","end":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,16]]}},"container-title":["Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,7,28]],"date-time":"2019-07-28T07:46:17Z","timestamp":1564299977000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.ijcai.org\/proceedings\/2019\/22"}},"subtitle":[],"proceedings-subject":"Artificial Intelligence Research Articles","short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,8]]},"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.24963\/ijcai.2019\/22","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,8]]}}}