{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,8,7]],"date-time":"2024-08-07T07:34:35Z","timestamp":1723016075891},"publisher-location":"California","reference-count":0,"publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,8]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We study a game between two firms which each provide a service based on machine learning.\u00a0 The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their products. The firms can decide whether or not they want to buy the data, as well as which learning model to build on that data. We demonstrate a reduction from this potentially complicated action space\u00a0 to a one-shot, two-action game in which each firm only decides whether or not to buy the data. The game admits several regimes which depend on the relative strength of the two firms at the outset and the price at which the data is being offered. We analyze the game's Nash equilibria in all parameter regimes and demonstrate that, in expectation, the outcome of the game is that the initially stronger firm's market position weakens whereas the initially weaker firm's market position becomes stronger. Finally, we consider the perspective of the users of the service and demonstrate that the expected outcome at equilibrium is not the one which maximizes the welfare of the consumers.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2019\/36","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,7,28]],"date-time":"2019-07-28T03:46:05Z","timestamp":1564285565000},"page":"252-258","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Equilibrium Characterization for Data Acquisition Games"],"prefix":"10.24963","author":[{"given":"Jinshuo","family":"Dong","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Pennsylvania"}]},{"given":"Hadi","family":"Elzayn","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Pennsylvania"}]},{"given":"Shahin","family":"Jabbari","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Pennsylvania"}]},{"given":"Michael","family":"Kearns","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Pennsylvania"}]},{"given":"Zachary","family":"Schutzman","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Pennsylvania"}]}],"member":"10584","event":{"number":"28","sponsor":["International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization (IJCAI)"],"acronym":"IJCAI-2019","name":"Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}","start":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,10]]},"theme":"Artificial Intelligence","location":"Macao, China","end":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,16]]}},"container-title":["Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,7,28]],"date-time":"2019-07-28T03:46:23Z","timestamp":1564285583000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.ijcai.org\/proceedings\/2019\/36"}},"subtitle":[],"proceedings-subject":"Artificial Intelligence Research Articles","short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,8]]},"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.24963\/ijcai.2019\/36","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,8]]}}}