{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,8,20]],"date-time":"2024-08-20T09:09:59Z","timestamp":1724144999317},"publisher-location":"California","reference-count":0,"publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,8]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We study the secretary problem in multi-agent environments.  In the standard secretary problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decision maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision whether to accept each award upon its arrival.  The requirement to make immediate decisions arises in many cases due to an implicit assumption regarding competition. Namely, if the decision maker does not take the offered award immediately, it will be taken by someone else. We introduce a novel multi-agent secretary model, in which the competition is explicit.\n\nIn our model, multiple agents compete over the arriving awards, but the decisions need not be immediate; instead, agents may select previous awards as long as they are available (i.e., not taken by another agent). If an award is selected by multiple agents, ties are broken either randomly or according to a global ranking.\n\nThis induces a multi-agent game in which the time of selection is not enforced by the rules of the games, rather it is an important component of the agent's strategy.\n\nWe study the structure and performance of equilibria in this game.\n\nFor random tie breaking, we characterize the equilibria of the  game, and show that the expected social welfare in equilibrium is nearly optimal, despite competition among the agents.\n\nFor ranked tie breaking, we give a full characterization of equilibria in the 3-agent game, and show that as the number of agents grows, the winning probability of every agent under non-immediate selections approaches her winning probability under immediate selections.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2021\/25","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,11]],"date-time":"2021-08-11T11:00:49Z","timestamp":1628679649000},"page":"175-181","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections"],"prefix":"10.24963","author":[{"given":"Tomer","family":"Ezra","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Tel Aviv University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Michal","family":"Feldman","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Tel Aviv University"},{"name":"Microsoft Research"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Ron","family":"Kupfer","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"The Hebrew University of Jerusalem"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"10584","event":{"number":"30","sponsor":["International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization (IJCAI)"],"acronym":"IJCAI-2021","name":"Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}","start":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,19]]},"theme":"Artificial Intelligence","location":"Montreal, Canada","end":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,27]]}},"container-title":["Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,11]],"date-time":"2021-08-11T11:00:57Z","timestamp":1628679657000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.ijcai.org\/proceedings\/2021\/25"}},"subtitle":[],"proceedings-subject":"Artificial Intelligence Research Articles","short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2021,8]]},"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.24963\/ijcai.2021\/25","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2021,8]]}}}