{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,24]],"date-time":"2025-09-24T00:14:36Z","timestamp":1758672876651,"version":"3.44.0"},"publisher-location":"California","reference-count":0,"publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2025,9]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee 1\/2 of their ideal utility (the highest achievable utility given their fair share of resources) robustly, i.e., under arbitrary behavior by the other agents. While this 1\/2-robustness guarantee has now been established under very different mechanisms, including pseudo-markets and dynamic max-min allocation, improving on it has appeared difficult.\n\n\n\nIn this work, we obtain the first significant improvement on the robustness of online resource sharing. In more detail, we consider the widely-studied repeated first-price auction with artificial currencies. Our main contribution is to show that a simple randomized bidding strategy can guarantee each agent a 2 - \u221a2 \u2248 0.59 fraction of her ideal utility, irrespective of others' bids. Specifically, our strategy requires each agent with fair share \u03b1 to use a uniformly distributed bid whenever her value is in the top \u03b1-quantile of her value distribution. Our work almost closes the gap to the known 1 - 1\/e \u2248 0.63 hardness for robust resource sharing; we also show that any static (i.e., budget independent) bidding policy cannot guarantee more than a 0.6-fraction of the ideal utility, showing our technique is almost tight.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2025\/21","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,19]],"date-time":"2025-09-19T08:10:40Z","timestamp":1758269440000},"page":"179-186","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Online Resource Sharing: Better Robust Guarantees via Randomized Strategies"],"prefix":"10.24963","author":[{"given":"David X.","family":"Lin","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Daniel","family":"Hall","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Giannis","family":"Fikioris","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Siddhartha","family":"Banerjee","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"\u00c9va","family":"Tardos","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"10584","event":{"number":"34","sponsor":["International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization (IJCAI)"],"acronym":"IJCAI-2025","name":"Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-25}","start":{"date-parts":[[2025,8,16]]},"theme":"Artificial Intelligence","location":"Montreal, Canada","end":{"date-parts":[[2025,8,22]]}},"container-title":["Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,23]],"date-time":"2025-09-23T11:32:36Z","timestamp":1758627156000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.ijcai.org\/proceedings\/2025\/21"}},"subtitle":[],"proceedings-subject":"Artificial Intelligence Research Articles","short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2025,9]]},"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.24963\/ijcai.2025\/21","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2025,9]]}}}