{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,10,27]],"date-time":"2024-10-27T04:12:47Z","timestamp":1730002367622,"version":"3.28.0"},"publisher-location":"California","reference-count":0,"publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024,11]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We introduce Incentive Design: a new class of problems for equilibrium verification in multi-agent systems. In our model, agents attempt to maximize their utility functions, which are expressed as formulae in LTL[F], a quantitative extension of Linear Temporal Logic with functions computable in polynomial time. We assume agents are rational, in the sense that they adopt strategies consistent with game theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. For each solution concept we consider, we analyze the problems of verifying whether an incentive scheme achieves a societal objective and finding one that does so, whether it be social welfare or any other aggregate measure of collective well-being. We study both static and dynamic incentive schemes, showing that the latter are more powerful than the former. Finally, we solve the incentive verification and synthesis problems for all the solution concepts we consider, and analyze their complexity.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.24963\/kr.2024\/44","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,10,26]],"date-time":"2024-10-26T06:30:28Z","timestamp":1729924228000},"page":"464-474","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Incentive Design for Rational Agents"],"prefix":"10.24963","author":[{"given":"David","family":"Hyland","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Oxford"}]},{"given":"Munyque","family":"Mittelmann","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Naples Federico II"}]},{"given":"Aniello","family":"Murano","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Naples Federico II"}]},{"given":"Giuseppe","family":"Perelli","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Sapienza University of Rome"}]},{"given":"Michael","family":"Wooldridge","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Oxford"}]}],"member":"10584","event":{"name":"21st International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2023}","theme":"Artificial Intelligence","location":"Hanoi, Vietnam","acronym":"KR-2024","number":"21","sponsor":["Artificial Intelligence Journal","Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Inc.","Academic College of Tel-Aviv","European Association for Artificial Intelligence","National Science Foundation"],"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,11,1]]},"end":{"date-parts":[[2024,11,8]]}},"container-title":["Proceedings of the TwentyFirst International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning"],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,10,26]],"date-time":"2024-10-26T06:30:37Z","timestamp":1729924237000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/proceedings.kr.org\/2024\/44"}},"subtitle":[],"proceedings-subject":"Artificial Intelligence Research Articles","short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2024,11]]},"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.24963\/kr.2024\/44","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2024,11]]}}}