{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,8,1]],"date-time":"2026-08-01T18:56:24Z","timestamp":1785610584477,"version":"3.56.0"},"reference-count":68,"publisher":"MIS Quarterly","issue":"1","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,3,1]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We study the potential for digital, online information and electronic voting to improve shareholder surplus by facilitating a new governance structure, owner-governance, which shifts control of the takeover decision from the board to shareholders. We compare analytical models of owner-governance to the current practice of delegated-governance in the context of increasing availability of online information, which increases public informedness. Our analysis shows that shareholders of the target firm and the acquirer both prefer owner-governance to delegated-governance when informedness is sufficiently high. Interestingly, we find a region where owner-governance offers a higher probability of takeover but delegated-governance offers higher shareholder surplus. Under delegated-governance, the board endogenously sets an entrenchment level that is always greater than the entrenchment level preferred by the shareholders and increasing informedness reduces the probability of a takeover. Our results suggest that owner-governance should be considered because of increasing informedness.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.25300\/misq\/2018\/13575","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,1,29]],"date-time":"2018-01-29T13:05:21Z","timestamp":1517231121000},"page":"45-62","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Governance of Corporate Takeovers: Time for Say-on-Takeovers?1"],"prefix":"10.25300","volume":"42","author":[{"given":"Joseph","family":"Vithayathil","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Business, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, Edwardsville, IL 62026-1106 U.S.A."}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Vidyanand","family":"Choudhary","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125 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