{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,22]],"date-time":"2025-10-22T23:35:57Z","timestamp":1761176157368,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"IOS Press","isbn-type":[{"value":"9781643686318","type":"electronic"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,21]],"date-time":"2025-10-21T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1761004800000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,21]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We study the heterogeneous facility location game model of n selfish agents on a line, where each agent\u2019s reachable range is a closed subinterval of the line. From two possible facilities, f1 and f2, exactly one is chosen to be built on some point of the line, and the agents have their own preferences p1, p2\u2208[0,1], p1+p2=1, over these two facilities. The utility of the agent is pi if the placement of the chosen facility fi is inside her reachable range, and zero otherwise. The task is to design mechanisms which get the input from the agents and select the type and placement point of the facility to be built, such that it maximizes the social welfare (defined as the total utility of all agents) while ensuring truthfulness, i.e., incentivizing agents to report their preferences (both facility type and placement) honestly as a dominant strategy. We analyze various scenarios with different setting of privacy of agents\u2019 positional and preference information. When the information is private to the agent, they have the option to misreport it, and hence, we will distinguish between reported information and public information. Initially, we consider the case where all facility preferences are 0 or 1 and we design an optimal mechanism for this case. We then study the case with fractional facility preferences. For the case of public preferences and reported positions, we obtain a mechanism yielding a 3-approximation of the optimum social welfare, and we prove that no deterministic mechanism can achieve approximation ratio better than 4\/3. Next, we study the case with public positions and reported preferences. In this setting we design a randomized 2-approximation, obtain lower bounds 3 and 3\/2 for the approximation factor of deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms, respectively, and show that a dictator-based approach is a 16\/7-approximation mechanism, where the 16\/7 factor is tight. Finally, we extend our results to the case of m facilities.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3233\/faia250951","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,22]],"date-time":"2025-10-22T09:46:53Z","timestamp":1761126413000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Heterogeneous Facility Location Game with Discrete Utility"],"prefix":"10.3233","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-3183-4126","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Sergio","family":"Cabello","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Ljubljana, Slovenia"},{"name":"Institute of Mathematics, Physics and Mechanics, Slovenia"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-3645-4210","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Arun Kumar","family":"Das","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Hyderabad, India"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-6657-0020","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jan Maty\u00e1\u0161","family":"K\u0159i\u0161t\u2019an","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Information Technology, Czech Technical University in Prague, Czech Republic"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-1228-7160","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Tom\u00e1\u0161","family":"Valla","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Information Technology, Czech Technical University in Prague, Czech Republic"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"7437","container-title":["Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications","ECAI 2025"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/ebooks.iospress.nl\/pdf\/doi\/10.3233\/FAIA250951","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,22]],"date-time":"2025-10-22T09:46:53Z","timestamp":1761126413000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/ebooks.iospress.nl\/doi\/10.3233\/FAIA250951"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,21]]},"ISBN":["9781643686318"],"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3233\/faia250951","relation":{},"ISSN":["0922-6389","1879-8314"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0922-6389","type":"print"},{"value":"1879-8314","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,21]]}}}