{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,22]],"date-time":"2025-10-22T23:36:00Z","timestamp":1761176160199,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"IOS Press","isbn-type":[{"value":"9781643686318","type":"electronic"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,21]],"date-time":"2025-10-21T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1761004800000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,21]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>Pre-game communication is a natural and practical way to facilitate coordination among players in the presence of multiple equilibria. We study how localised communication, in the form of a partition where only players within the same coalition can coordinate on a joint action, can improve the social efficiency of the Weighted Singleton Congestion Games, a common type of a strategic resource allocation problem. We assume that players within a coalition can reach an agreement (a pure joint action) if it is credible (no profitable deviation), Pareto-optimal, and envy-free (no player envies the assignment of another player), and that players respect the principle of indifference (i.e., attribute equal probability to symmetric outcomes) about the behaviour of players in other coalitions. Under these assumptions, some partitioning of players induce a unique correlated strategy profile which we term the partition equilibrium. We characterise the set of partition equilibria that can arise in weighted singleton congestion games and show that the optimal partition can significantly improve the worst-case makespan of the game, from an m-approximation of the social-optimal outcome to a 2-approximation.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3233\/faia250960","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,22]],"date-time":"2025-10-22T09:47:09Z","timestamp":1761126429000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Partition Equilibria in Weighted Singleton Congestion Games"],"prefix":"10.3233","author":[{"given":"Wei-Chen","family":"Lee","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Oxford"}]},{"given":"Alessandro","family":"Abate","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Oxford"}]},{"given":"Michael","family":"Wooldridge","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Oxford"}]}],"member":"7437","container-title":["Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications","ECAI 2025"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/ebooks.iospress.nl\/pdf\/doi\/10.3233\/FAIA250960","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,22]],"date-time":"2025-10-22T09:47:09Z","timestamp":1761126429000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/ebooks.iospress.nl\/doi\/10.3233\/FAIA250960"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,21]]},"ISBN":["9781643686318"],"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3233\/faia250960","relation":{},"ISSN":["0922-6389","1879-8314"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0922-6389","type":"print"},{"value":"1879-8314","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,21]]}}}