{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,12]],"date-time":"2025-03-12T04:13:01Z","timestamp":1741752781658,"version":"3.38.0"},"reference-count":21,"publisher":"SAGE Publications","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2016,6,4]],"date-time":"2016-06-04T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1464998400000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/page\/policies\/text-and-data-mining-license"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["journals.sagepub.com"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Intelligenza Artificiale: The international journal of the AIxIA"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,6,4]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> The adoption of Nash equilibrium (NE) in real\u2013world settings is often impractical due to its too restrictive assumptions. Game theory and artificial intelligence provide alternative (relaxed) solution concepts. When knowledge about opponents\u2019 utilities and types are not available, the appropriate solution concept for extensive\u2013form games is the self\u2013confirming equilibrium (SCE), which relaxes NE allowing agents to have wrong beliefs off the equilibrium path. In this paper, we provide the first computational and learning study of the situations in which a two\u2013agent extensive\u2013form game is played by heterogeneous populations of individuals that repeatedly match (e.g., eBay): we extend the SCE concept, we study the equilibrium computation problem, and we study how these equilibria affect learning dynamics. We show that SCEs are crucial for characterizing both stable states of learning dynamics and the dynamics themselves. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3233\/ia-160092","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2016,6,7]],"date-time":"2016-06-07T12:38:31Z","timestamp":1465303111000},"page":"19-31","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/sage-journals-update-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Extensive\u2013form games with heterogeneous populations: solution concepts, equilibria characterization, learning dynamics"],"prefix":"10.1177","volume":"10","author":[{"given":"Nicola","family":"Gatti","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32 Milano, Italy"}]},{"given":"Fabio","family":"Panozzo","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32 Milano, Italy"}]},{"given":"Marcello","family":"Restelli","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32 Milano, Italy"}]}],"member":"179","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,6,4]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref001","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-009-0449-x"},{"key":"ref002","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1613\/jair.3070"},{"key":"ref003","first-page":"44","author":"Cai K.","year":"2008","journal-title":"Adaptation and Multi-Agent Learning"},{"key":"ref004","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/2884.001.0001"},{"key":"ref005","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1132516.1132527"},{"key":"ref006","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(03)00121-0"},{"key":"ref007","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2951716"},{"key":"ref008","unstructured":"FudenbergD. and TiroleJ., Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1991."},{"key":"ref009","first-page":"813","author":"Gatti N.","year":"2012","journal-title":"In AAMAS"},{"key":"ref010","first-page":"981","author":"Gatti N.","year":"2011","journal-title":"In AAMAS"},{"key":"ref011","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1995.1053"},{"key":"ref012","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1996.0051"},{"key":"ref013","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1912767"},{"key":"ref014","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BFb0120779"},{"key":"ref015","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/0112033"},{"key":"ref016","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1109557.1109570"},{"key":"ref017","first-page":"441","author":"Osepayshvili A.","year":"2005","journal-title":"In UAI"},{"key":"ref018","first-page":"664","author":"Porter R.","year":"2004","journal-title":"In AAAI"},{"key":"ref019","first-page":"495","author":"Sandholm T.","year":"2005","journal-title":"In AAAI"},{"key":"ref020","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511811654"},{"key":"ref021","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-005-3783-9"}],"container-title":["Intelligenza Artificiale: The international journal of the AIxIA"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.3233\/IA-160092","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/full-xml\/10.3233\/IA-160092","content-type":"application\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.3233\/IA-160092","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,11]],"date-time":"2025-03-11T03:53:14Z","timestamp":1741665194000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/10.3233\/IA-160092"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2016,6,4]]},"references-count":21,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,6,4]]}},"alternative-id":["10.3233\/IA-160092"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3233\/ia-160092","relation":{},"ISSN":["1724-8035","2211-0097"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"1724-8035"},{"type":"electronic","value":"2211-0097"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2016,6,4]]}}}