{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,21]],"date-time":"2026-04-21T22:49:51Z","timestamp":1776811791517,"version":"3.51.2"},"reference-count":21,"publisher":"European Society of Computational Methods in Sciences and Engineering","issue":"6","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["JCM"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,15]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>The key to the reform of the power system is to design a fair bidding and trading system. Analyzing the transaction process of electricity price competition, suppressing market power and other unfavorable factors, and finding a perfect bidding system are the research goals of this paper. In order to study the competition in the power spot market and power contract market, this paper employs the game model of complete information and the game theory as a tool. The power spot market adopts the Market Clearing Price (MCP) settlement method, in which the power grid determines the maximal real-time price of the generator node as the MCP. The price is based on the three bidding strategy curves of the power plant. As a result, a Nash equilibrium of power plant revenue is formed. According to the Cournot model and Stackelberg model that analyze the power contract market, the long-term equilibrium price of Stackelberg model in the power contract market is higher than that of the perfectly competitive market and less than or equal to the output of perfect monopoly market. The long-term equilibrium price and output in the power contract market are both certain and stable. This paper has analyzed the static game of complete information in the power market and carried out practical application. The results show that the bidding strategies of power plants have a Nash equilibrium and they have an incentive to collude. The MCP mechanism cannot solve the problem of market power influence. The conclusion of the research provides a basis for the design of the power hybrid auction system.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3233\/jcm-226926","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,19]],"date-time":"2023-12-19T12:23:08Z","timestamp":1702988588000},"page":"3163-3176","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Formation mechanism of on-grid power tariff using game model of complete information"],"prefix":"10.66113","volume":"23","author":[{"given":"Jiaojiao","family":"Li","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Business, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Linfeng","family":"Zhao","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"The Physics Department, School of Arts and Sciences Boston University, Boston, MA, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Lihao","family":"Dong","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Lawrence Academy Grade 11, Groton, MA, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"55691","reference":[{"key":"10.3233\/JCM-226926_ref1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"578","DOI":"10.2112\/SI93-077.1","article-title":"Application of cooperation game theory in reactive power market of hydraulic\u00a0\u2013 power plant","volume":"93","author":"Lin","year":"2019","journal-title":"J Coastal Res."},{"key":"10.3233\/JCM-226926_ref2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"398","DOI":"10.2112\/JCR-SI104-071.1","article-title":"Game analysis of hydropower bidding under incomplete information","volume":"104","author":"Li","year":"2020","journal-title":"J Coastal 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Appl Energy."},{"key":"10.3233\/JCM-226926_ref16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"135657","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jclepro.2022.135657","article-title":"Coal-fired power plant CCUS project comprehensive benefit evaluation and forecasting model study","volume":"385","author":"Han","journal-title":"J Clean Prod."},{"key":"10.3233\/JCM-226926_ref17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"116268","DOI":"10.1016\/j.apenergy.2020.116268","article-title":"Peer-to-peer energy trading: A review of the literature","volume":"283","author":"Soto","year":"2021","journal-title":"Appl Energ."},{"key":"10.3233\/JCM-226926_ref18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"112189","DOI":"10.1016\/j.rser.2022.112189","article-title":"Electricity trading for coal-fired power plants in Turkish power market considering uncertainty in spot, derivatives and bilateral contract market","volume":"159","author":"Yucekaya","year":"2022","journal-title":"Renew Sust Energ Rev."},{"key":"10.3233\/JCM-226926_ref19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"118393","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jclepro.2019.118393","article-title":"Robust bidding strategy for demand response aggregators in electricity market based on game theory","volume":"243","author":"Abapour","year":"2020","journal-title":"J Clean Prod."},{"key":"10.3233\/JCM-226926_ref20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Mei J, Chen C, Wang J, Kirtley JL. Coalitional game theory based local power exchange algorithm for networked microgrids Appl Energ. 2019; 239: 133-141.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.apenergy.2019.01.208"},{"key":"10.3233\/JCM-226926_ref21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"119668","DOI":"10.1016\/j.energy.2020.119668","article-title":"Stochastic energy management of smart microgrid with intermittent renewable energy resources in electricity market","volume":"219","author":"Hasankhani","year":"2021","journal-title":"Energy."}],"container-title":["Journal of Computational Methods in Sciences and Engineering"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/content.iospress.com\/download?id=10.3233\/JCM-226926","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,21]],"date-time":"2026-04-21T22:07:09Z","timestamp":1776809229000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/full\/10.3233\/JCM-226926"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,15]]},"references-count":21,"journal-issue":{"issue":"6"},"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3233\/jcm-226926","relation":{},"ISSN":["1472-7978","1875-8983"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1472-7978","type":"print"},{"value":"1875-8983","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,15]]}}}