{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,5]],"date-time":"2026-06-05T12:25:32Z","timestamp":1780662332960,"version":"3.54.1"},"reference-count":46,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"8","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,7,24]],"date-time":"2024-07-24T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1721779200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Entropy"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Recently, research interest in the field of infrastructure attack and defense scenarios has increased. Numerous methods have been proposed for studying strategy interactions that combine complex network theory and game theory. However, the unavoidable effect of constrained strategies in complex situations has not been considered in previous studies. This study introduces a novel approach to analyzing these interactions by including the effects of constrained strategies, a factor often neglected in traditional analyses. First, we introduce the rule of constraints on strategies, which depends on the average distance between selected nodes. As the average distance increases, the probability of choosing the corresponding strategy decreases. Second, we establish an attacker\u2013defender game model with constrained strategies based on the above rule and using information theory to evaluate the uncertainty of these strategies. Finally, we present a method for solving this problem and conduct experiments based on a target network. The results highlight the unique characteristics of the Nash equilibrium when setting constraints, as these constraints influence decision makers\u2019 Nash equilibria. When considering the constrained strategies, both the attacker and the defender tend to select strategies with lower average distances. The effect of the constraints on their strategies becomes less apparent as the number of attackable or defendable nodes increases. This research advances the field by introducing a novel framework for examining strategic interactions in infrastructure defense and attack scenarios. By incorporating strategy constraints, our work offers a new perspective on the critical area of infrastructure security.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/e26080624","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,7,24]],"date-time":"2024-07-24T15:47:32Z","timestamp":1721836052000},"page":"624","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["An Attacker\u2013Defender Game Model with Constrained Strategies"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"26","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0006-9203-5666","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jiaqi","family":"Ren","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"National Key Laboratory of Information Systems Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Jin","family":"Liu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"National Key Laboratory of Information Systems Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0001-9920-8113","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Yibo","family":"Dong","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"National Key Laboratory of Information Systems Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Zhe","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"National Key Laboratory of Information Systems Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Weili","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"National Key Laboratory of Information Systems Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,7,24]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Brown, G.G., Carlyle, W.M., Salmeron, J., and Wood, K. 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