{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,3]],"date-time":"2025-11-03T17:56:28Z","timestamp":1762192588481,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":16,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"11","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,31]],"date-time":"2025-10-31T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1761868800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"name":"China Southern Power Grid\u2019s major network-level scientific and technological project \u201cResearch and Application of Multi-dimensional Active Defense Technology for Digital Grid\u201d","award":["037800KC24040002","GDKJXM20240428"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["037800KC24040002","GDKJXM20240428"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Future Internet"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Traditional cyber attack-defense strategies have traditionally focused solely on the attacker and defender, while neglecting the role of government-led system administrators. To address strategic selection challenges in cyber warfare, this study employs an evolutionary game theory framework to construct a tripartite game model involving cyber attackers, defenders, and system administrators. The replicator dynamic equation is utilized for stability analysis of behavioral strategies across stakeholders, with Lyapunov theory applied to evaluate the equilibrium points of pure strategies within the system. MATLAB (2021a) simulations were conducted to validate theoretical findings. Experimental results demonstrate that the model achieves evolutionary stability under various scenarios, yielding optimal defense strategies that provide theoretical support for addressing cybersecurity challenges.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/fi17110499","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,3]],"date-time":"2025-11-03T17:32:01Z","timestamp":1762191121000},"page":"499","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model and Stability Analysis for Network Defense Strategy Selection"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"17","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0000-6945-9053","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Zhenghao","family":"Qian","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0000-6905-2552","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Fengzheng","family":"Liu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0008-6507-2829","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Mingdong","family":"He","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0008-0780-4462","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Bo","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0004-9147-2974","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Xuewu","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China"}]},{"given":"Chuangye","family":"Zhao","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China"}]},{"given":"Gehua","family":"Fu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China"}]},{"given":"Yifan","family":"Hu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,31]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"Alese, B.K., Ibidunmoye, E.O., and Haruna, D.I. 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Intell."}],"container-title":["Future Internet"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/1999-5903\/17\/11\/499\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,3]],"date-time":"2025-11-03T17:43:36Z","timestamp":1762191816000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/1999-5903\/17\/11\/499"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,31]]},"references-count":16,"journal-issue":{"issue":"11","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,11]]}},"alternative-id":["fi17110499"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/fi17110499","relation":{},"ISSN":["1999-5903"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1999-5903","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,31]]}}}