{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T20:16:38Z","timestamp":1760300198341,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":52,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,3,14]],"date-time":"2019-03-14T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1552521600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001691","name":"Japan Society for the Promotion of Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["18H05680"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["18H05680"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001691","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Agency may be exercised by different entities (e.g., individuals, firms, households). A given individual can form part of multiple agents (e.g., he may belong to a firm and a household). The set of agents that act in a given situation might not be common knowledge. We adapt the standard model of incomplete information to model such situations.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g10010014","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,3,15]],"date-time":"2019-03-15T04:12:09Z","timestamp":1552623129000},"page":"14","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Agency Equilibrium"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"10","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3290-9721","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jonathan","family":"Newton","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,3,14]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"Zalta, E.N. (2015). 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