{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T20:17:06Z","timestamp":1760300226385,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":12,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,7]],"date-time":"2019-05-07T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1557187200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We propose a new family of mechanisms, whereby players may give more or less directly to one another. A cornerstone case is the regular linear public goods mechanism (LPGM), where all contribute into a single common group account, the total amount of which is then distributed equally among players. We show that with sufficiently (yet not necessarily fully) pro-social preferences, the social optimum can be reached in Nash equilibrium in all social dilemma situations described by our mechanisms (including the LPGM). In addition, for a given heterogeneity of pro-social preferences, we help to identify which specific mechanisms perform best in terms of incentivizing giving. Our results are therefore relevant from two vantage points. One, they provide proper rational choice benchmarks based on Nash equilibrium under the assumption of other-regarding preferences. Two, they provide arguments in favor of re-structuring many collective action problems currently implemented as LPGMs when it is feasible to gain some information concerning who has concern for whom.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g10020021","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,9]],"date-time":"2019-05-09T11:22:35Z","timestamp":1557400955000},"page":"21","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Give and Let Give: Alternative Mechanisms Based on Voluntary Contributions"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"10","author":[{"given":"Philip D.","family":"Grech","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Management, Technology and Economics, ETH Zurich, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,7]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1335","DOI":"10.1086\/226937","article-title":"Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem","volume":"84","author":"Marwell","year":"1979","journal-title":"Am. J. Sociol."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"51","DOI":"10.1016\/0047-2727(85)90038-6","article-title":"Public goods provision in an experimental environment","volume":"26","author":"Isaac","year":"1985","journal-title":"J. Public Econ."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Kagel, J.H., and Roth, A.E. (1995). Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research. Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.","DOI":"10.1515\/9780691213255"},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"47","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-010-9257-1","article-title":"Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature","volume":"14","author":"Chaudhuri","year":"2011","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"783","DOI":"10.2307\/1912672","article-title":"Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the \u201cFree Rider\u201d Problem","volume":"45","author":"Groves","year":"1977","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"204","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2016.01.005","article-title":"Generalized Groves\u2013Ledyard mechanisms","volume":"101","author":"Healy","year":"2017","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"413","DOI":"10.1038\/530413a","article-title":"Sustainability: Game human nature","volume":"530","author":"Fehr","year":"2016","journal-title":"Nat. News"},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Grech, P., and Nax, H.H. (2018). Nash Equilibria of dictator games: A new perspective. Preprint.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.2989644"},{"key":"ref_9","unstructured":"Saijo, T. (2014). The Instability of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management. Working Papers SDES-2014-3."},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"67","DOI":"10.1016\/j.socec.2017.12.002","article-title":"Instability in the voluntary contribution mechanism with a quasi-linear payoff function: An experimental analysis","volume":"72","author":"Feng","year":"2018","journal-title":"J. Behav. Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1339","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.15000001","article-title":"Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy","volume":"105","author":"Nordhaus","year":"2015","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"179","DOI":"10.2307\/1882648","article-title":"Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism","volume":"103","author":"Isaac","year":"1988","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/10\/2\/21\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T12:49:41Z","timestamp":1760186981000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/10\/2\/21"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,7]]},"references-count":12,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,6]]}},"alternative-id":["g10020021"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g10020021","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,7]]}}}