{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,28]],"date-time":"2026-02-28T16:41:08Z","timestamp":1772296868806,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":21,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2010,4,15]],"date-time":"2010-04-15T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1271289600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sj\u00f6str\u00f6m [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the \u03b1-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g1020066","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,4,15]],"date-time":"2010-04-15T10:51:29Z","timestamp":1271328689000},"page":"66-88","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"1","author":[{"given":"Chen-Ying","family":"Huang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, 21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan"}]},{"given":"Tomas","family":"Sj\u00f6str\u00f6m","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08901, USA"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,4,15]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"217","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01766876","article-title":"Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures","volume":"3","author":"Aumann","year":"1974","journal-title":"Int. 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Econ."},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"13","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(79)90060-7","article-title":"A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocations","volume":"20","author":"Kalai","year":"1979","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"41","DOI":"10.1007\/s11238-007-9030-x","article-title":"A Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games","volume":"63","year":"2007","journal-title":"Theory Decis."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"559","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2008.04.002","article-title":"Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities","volume":"66","year":"2009","journal-title":"Games Econ. 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A Coase Theorem Based on a New Concept of the Core, Unpublished manuscript."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/1\/2\/66\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T22:02:09Z","timestamp":1760220129000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/1\/2\/66"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2010,4,15]]},"references-count":21,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,6]]}},"alternative-id":["g1020066"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g1020066","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2073-4336","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2010,4,15]]}}}