{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,5,14]],"date-time":"2026-05-14T10:09:51Z","timestamp":1778753391765,"version":"3.51.4"},"reference-count":27,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2010,7,29]],"date-time":"2010-07-29T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1280361600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population and of the graph that represents the network of contacts. We apply the model to the class of pure and general coordination games. For pure coordination games, the networks co-evolve towards the polarization of different strategies. In the case of general coordination games our results show that the possibility of refusing neighbors and choosing different partners increases the success rate of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g1030242","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,7,29]],"date-time":"2010-07-29T11:15:59Z","timestamp":1280402159000},"page":"242-261","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":15,"title":["Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"1","author":[{"given":"Marco","family":"Tomassini","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Systems Institute, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Enea","family":"Pestelacci","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Information Systems Institute, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,7,29]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Vega-Redondo, F. (2003). Economics and the Theory of Games, Cambridge University Press.","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511753954"},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1560","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1133755","article-title":"Five rules for the evolution of cooperation","volume":"314","author":"Nowak","year":"2006","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Gintis, H. (2009). Game Theory Evolving, Princeton University Press.","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400830077"},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"826","DOI":"10.1038\/359826a0","article-title":"Evolutionary games and spatial chaos","volume":"359","author":"Nowak","year":"1992","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"167","DOI":"10.1137\/S003614450342480","article-title":"The structure and function of complex networks","volume":"45","author":"Newman","year":"2003","journal-title":"SIAM Rev."},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"97","DOI":"10.1016\/j.physrep.2007.04.004","article-title":"Evolutionary games on graphs","volume":"446","year":"2007","journal-title":"Phys. Rep."},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"098104","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevLett.95.098104","article-title":"Scale-Free Networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation","volume":"95","author":"Santos","year":"2005","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. Lett."},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"955","DOI":"10.1016\/j.physa.2007.09.046","article-title":"Cooperation and community structure in social networks","volume":"387","author":"Luthi","year":"2008","journal-title":"Physica A"},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Skyrms, B. (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Cambridge University Press.","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139165228"},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"208","DOI":"10.1016\/j.plrev.2009.08.001","article-title":"Evolutionary Game theory: temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics","volume":"6","author":"Roca","year":"2009","journal-title":"Phys. Life Rev."},{"key":"ref_11","unstructured":"Rocha, L.M. (2006). Artificial Life X, The MIT Press."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1284","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pcbi.0020140","article-title":"Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social ties","volume":"2","author":"Santos","year":"2006","journal-title":"PLOS Comp. Biol."},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"056118","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.72.056118","article-title":"Cooperation, social networks, and the emergence of leadership in a prisoner\u2019s dilemma with adaptive local interactions","volume":"72","author":"Zimmermann","year":"2005","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"109","DOI":"10.1016\/j.biosystems.2009.10.003","article-title":"Coevolutionary Games\u2014A mini review","volume":"99","author":"Perc","year":"2010","journal-title":"Biosystems"},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"139","DOI":"10.1162\/biot.2008.3.2.139","article-title":"Evolution of cooperation and coordination in a dynamically networked society","volume":"3","author":"Pestelacci","year":"2008","journal-title":"J. Biol. Theory"},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"50","DOI":"10.1016\/j.biosystems.2009.08.008","article-title":"Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary Hawks-Doves Game","volume":"99","author":"Tomassini","year":"2010","journal-title":"Biosystems"},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Jackson, M.O. (2008). Social and Economic Networks, Princeton University Press.","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400833993"},{"key":"ref_18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"29","DOI":"10.2307\/2951777","article-title":"Learning, mutation, and long-run equilibria in games","volume":"61","author":"Kandori","year":"1993","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1047","DOI":"10.2307\/2951493","article-title":"Learning, local interaction, and coordination","volume":"61","author":"Ellison","year":"1993","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"65","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1996.0076","article-title":"Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching","volume":"70","author":"Robson","year":"1996","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"57","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-937X.00121","article-title":"Contagion","volume":"67","author":"Morris","year":"2000","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"ref_22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"9340","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.97.16.9340","article-title":"A dynamic model for social network formation","volume":"97","author":"Skyrms","year":"2000","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"ref_23","unstructured":"Schelling, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press."},{"key":"ref_24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"75","DOI":"10.1016\/j.physrep.2009.11.002","article-title":"Community detection in graphs","volume":"486","author":"Fortunato","year":"2010","journal-title":"Phys. Rep."},{"key":"ref_25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"026113","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.69.026113","article-title":"Finding and evaluating community structure in networks","volume":"69","author":"Newman","year":"2004","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"ref_26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"8577","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0601602103","article-title":"Modularity and community structure in networks","volume":"103","author":"Newman","year":"2006","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"ref_27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"643","DOI":"10.1038\/nature02360","article-title":"Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game","volume":"428","author":"Hauert","year":"2004","journal-title":"Nature"}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/1\/3\/242\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T22:03:02Z","timestamp":1760220182000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/1\/3\/242"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2010,7,29]]},"references-count":27,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,9]]}},"alternative-id":["g1030242"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g1030242","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2073-4336","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2010,7,29]]}}}