{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,13]],"date-time":"2026-03-13T07:08:24Z","timestamp":1773385704513,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":20,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2010,9,2]],"date-time":"2010-09-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1283385600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g1030286","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,9,19]],"date-time":"2010-09-19T09:41:46Z","timestamp":1284889306000},"page":"286-298","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":24,"title":["Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"1","author":[{"given":"P. Jean-Jacques","family":"Herings","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Ana","family":"Mauleon","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"FNRS and CEREC, Facult\u00e9s universitaires Saint-Louis, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Brussels, Belgium"},{"name":"FNRS and CORE, Universit\u00e9 catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 134 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Vincent","family":"Vannetelbosch","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"FNRS and CORE, Universit\u00e9 catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 134 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,9,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1047","DOI":"10.2307\/1912051","article-title":"Endogenous formation of coalitions","volume":"51","author":"Hart","year":"1983","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"299","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1994.1044","article-title":"Farsighted coalitional stability","volume":"63","author":"Chwe","year":"1994","journal-title":"J. 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