{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T04:40:05Z","timestamp":1760244005724,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":23,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,8]],"date-time":"2010-10-08T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1286496000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and arbitrary strategic games and allows to strengthen the above result to arbitrary games, other rationality notions, and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. We also clarify what conclusions one can draw for the customary dominance notions that are not monotonic. The main tool is Tarski\u2019s Fixpoint Theorem.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g1040381","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,8]],"date-time":"2010-10-08T11:41:49Z","timestamp":1286538109000},"page":"381-394","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":10,"title":["The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"1","author":[{"given":"Krzysztof R.","family":"Apt","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Centrum for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI), University of Amsterdam, Science Park 123, 1098 XG Amsterdam, The Netherlands"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Jonathan A.","family":"Zvesper","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Oxford University, Computing Laboratory, Wolfson Building, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD, UK"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,8]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1255","DOI":"10.2307\/2938316","article-title":"Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities","volume":"58","author":"Milgrom","year":"1990","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"299","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2007.02.002","article-title":"Iterated strict dominance in general games","volume":"61","author":"Chen","year":"2007","journal-title":"Games Econ. 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