{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T19:44:51Z","timestamp":1760298291418,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":18,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,21]],"date-time":"2010-10-21T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1287619200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal endowments supports the conclusion that behavior is better captured by intuitive notions of reciprocity than by inequality aversion. Extending the model by allowing for alternative reference points promises better performance, but leads to other problems. We conclude that the fact that inequality aversion often works as a good short-hand for reciprocity is driven by biased design choices.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g1040459","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,21]],"date-time":"2010-10-21T12:35:22Z","timestamp":1287664522000},"page":"459-477","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":12,"title":["Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"1","author":[{"given":"Dirk","family":"Engelmann","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Mannheim,L7, 3-5, 68131 Mannheim, Germany"},{"name":"Centre for Experimental Economics, University of Copenhagen, \u00d8ster Farimagsgade 5, 1353 K\u00f8benhavn K, Denmark"},{"name":"Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, P.O. Box 882 Politickych veznu 7, 111 21 Praha 1, Czech Republic"}]},{"given":"Martin","family":"Strobel","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,21]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"817","DOI":"10.1162\/003355399556151","article-title":"A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation","volume":"114","author":"Fehr","year":"1999","journal-title":"Quart. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"166","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.90.1.166","article-title":"ERC\u2014A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition","volume":"90","author":"Bolton","year":"2000","journal-title":"Amer. Econ. 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