{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T02:43:37Z","timestamp":1760237017939,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":25,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,2,7]],"date-time":"2020-02-07T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1581033600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"name":"TUBITAK","award":["215K424"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["215K424"]}]},{"name":"Istanbul Bilgi University","award":["BAP-2017"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["BAP-2017"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>The purpose of this study is to experimentally test Trockel\u2019s game, which is a modelling of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG), and determine whether one of the two theories of Equality and Deterrence may better account for the observed behavior. The CSG is an example of a simple game in extensive form where the actual behavior of well-informed players cannot be expected to agree with the clear results of game theoretical reasoning. To explain the disagreement between the theory and the expected behavior, Trockel\u2019s game is proposed as an alternative modelling of the scenario. The existence of more than one equilibrium in Trockel\u2019s game opens a door for reputation building. This study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose. According to my data, there is some evidence in favor of both Equality and Deterrence Hypotheses. However, since the strategies compatible with the Equality Hypothesis are played more frequently, I observe some patterns which share the same intuition with the Deterrence Hypothesis.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g11010009","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,2,7]],"date-time":"2020-02-07T11:50:28Z","timestamp":1581076228000},"page":"9","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel\u2019s Model of Selten\u2019s Chain Store Story"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"11","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2518-127X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Papatya","family":"Duman","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Paderborn University, 33098 Paderborn, Germany"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,2,7]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"127","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00131770","article-title":"The chain store paradox","volume":"9","author":"Selten","year":"1978","journal-title":"Theory Decis."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"253","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(82)90030-8","article-title":"Reputation and imperfect information","volume":"27","author":"Kreps","year":"1982","journal-title":"J. Econ. 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