{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T02:50:38Z","timestamp":1760237438669,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":37,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,5,19]],"date-time":"2020-05-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1589846400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>This paper experimentally investigates the impact of suggestive messages and tipping on a third party\u2019s judgment. The experimental design uses a model with three players, wherein two players (A and B) create a joint project, and the third player (C) decides how to divide the project\u2019s earnings between the first two players. In two treatments, player B has an opportunity to influence player C\u2019s decision via a numeric message or an ex-post tip. The main finding of this paper is that giving player B the option to suggest a specific amount to the allocator does not increase his share. In contrast, when player C knows that player B can send him a tip, the share awarded to player B increases.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g11020023","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,5,20]],"date-time":"2020-05-20T10:37:38Z","timestamp":1589971058000},"page":"23","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["The Role of Suggestions and Tips in Distorting a Third Party\u2019s Decision"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"11","author":[{"given":"Daniel","family":"Parra","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin, Germany"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,5,19]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"917","DOI":"10.1093\/jeea\/jvy043","article-title":"Bribery: Behavioral drivers of distorted decisions","volume":"17","author":"Gneezy","year":"2018","journal-title":"J. Eur. Econ. Assoc."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1007\/s11127-006-9102-4","article-title":"Lobbying, corruption and political influence","volume":"131","author":"Campos","year":"2007","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"10","DOI":"10.5465\/amr.2006.19379621","article-title":"Conflicts of interest and the case of auditor independence: Moral seduction and strategic issue cycling","volume":"31","author":"Moore","year":"2006","journal-title":"Acad. Manag. Rev."},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bennedsen, M., Feldmann, S.E., and Dreyer Lassen, D. (2009). Strong firms lobby, weak firms bribe: A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption. EPRU Work. Pap. Ser.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.1503028"},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Abbink, K. (2006). Laboratory experiments on corruption. Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Edward Elgar Publishing.","DOI":"10.4337\/9781847203106.00023"},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"265","DOI":"10.1016\/S0167-2681(00)00089-5","article-title":"The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution","volume":"42","author":"Abbink","year":"2000","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"428","DOI":"10.1093\/jleo\/18.2.428","article-title":"An experimental bribery game","volume":"18","author":"Abbink","year":"2002","journal-title":"J. Law Econ. Organ."},{"key":"ref_8","first-page":"337","article-title":"Corruption investigated in the lab: A survey of the experimental literature","volume":"2","author":"Bobkova","year":"2012","journal-title":"Int. J. Latest Trends Financ. Econ. Sci."},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"799","DOI":"10.2307\/2111575","article-title":"Information and influence: Lobbying for agendas and votes","volume":"37","year":"1993","journal-title":"Am. J. Political Sci."},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"269","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00149180","article-title":"Lobbying and asymmetric information","volume":"74","author":"Potters","year":"1992","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"170","DOI":"10.1027\/1618-3169\/a000361","article-title":"On the inability to ignore useless advice","volume":"64","author":"Schultze","year":"2017","journal-title":"Exp. Psychol."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"267","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-1765(03)00191-5","article-title":"Communication in ultimatum games","volume":"81","author":"Rankin","year":"2003","journal-title":"Econ. Lett."},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"16","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2010.03.011","article-title":"Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games","volume":"108","author":"Andersson","year":"2010","journal-title":"Econ. Lett."},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.socec.2010.09.009","article-title":"Lavish returns on cheap talk: Two-way communication in trust games","volume":"40","author":"Putterman","year":"2011","journal-title":"J. Sociol. Econ."},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"833","DOI":"10.2307\/2171941","article-title":"Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence","volume":"65","author":"Fehr","year":"1997","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"437","DOI":"10.2307\/2118338","article-title":"Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation","volume":"108","author":"Fehr","year":"1993","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"887","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008","article-title":"Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study","volume":"20","author":"Abbink","year":"2004","journal-title":"Eur. J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"10651","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1423035112","article-title":"The collaborative roots of corruption","volume":"112","author":"Weisel","year":"2015","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"ref_19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"493","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20140890","article-title":"You owe me","volume":"107","author":"Malmendier","year":"2017","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"25","DOI":"10.2307\/2111334","article-title":"Counteractive lobbying","volume":"38","author":"Wright","year":"1994","journal-title":"Am. J. Political Sci."},{"key":"ref_21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1162","DOI":"10.1086\/692473","article-title":"Ex post lobbying","volume":"79","author":"You","year":"2017","journal-title":"J. Politics"},{"key":"ref_22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"511","DOI":"10.2307\/2118480","article-title":"Asymmetric tournaments, equal opportunity laws, and affirmative action: Some experimental results","volume":"107","author":"Schotter","year":"1992","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1086\/261439","article-title":"Tournaments and piece rates: An experimental study","volume":"95","author":"Bull","year":"1987","journal-title":"J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"177","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.97.2.177","article-title":"Adding a stick to the carrot? The interaction of bonuses and fines","volume":"97","author":"Fehr","year":"2007","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Camerer, C.F. (2011). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction, Princeton University Press.","DOI":"10.2307\/j.ctvcm4j8j.18"},{"key":"ref_26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"818","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.97.3.818","article-title":"The pluralism of fairness ideals: An experimental approach","volume":"97","author":"Cappelen","year":"2007","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"817","DOI":"10.1162\/003355399556151","article-title":"A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation","volume":"114","author":"Fehr","year":"1999","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_28","first-page":"141","article-title":"The social norm of tipping: Does it improve social welfare?","volume":"85","author":"Azar","year":"2005","journal-title":"J. Econ. Z. F\u00fcr Natl."},{"key":"ref_29","unstructured":"Abbink, K. (2000). Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption, Universit\u00e4t Bonn. No. 1\/2000. Bonn Econ Discussion Papers."},{"key":"ref_30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"817","DOI":"10.1162\/003355302760193904","article-title":"Understanding social preferences with simple tests","volume":"117","author":"Charness","year":"2002","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_31","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1084","DOI":"10.1108\/03068290310492878","article-title":"The implications of tipping for economics and management","volume":"30","author":"Azar","year":"2003","journal-title":"Int. J. Soc. Econ."},{"key":"ref_32","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-006-9159-4","article-title":"z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments","volume":"10","author":"Fischbacher","year":"2007","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_33","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"286","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1997.2359","article-title":"A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk","volume":"78","author":"Crawford","year":"1998","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_34","first-page":"806","article-title":"The deadline effect in bargaining: Some experimental evidence","volume":"78","author":"Roth","year":"1988","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_35","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"98","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-8721.ep10768783","article-title":"Statistical power analysis","volume":"1","author":"Cohen","year":"1992","journal-title":"Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci."},{"key":"ref_36","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"321","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2010.09.008","article-title":"A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences","volume":"Volume 72","author":"Blanco","year":"2011","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"ref_37","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.joep.2015.12.009","article-title":"Inequity aversion revisited","volume":"54","author":"Yang","year":"2016","journal-title":"J. Econ. Psychol."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/11\/2\/23\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T09:30:19Z","timestamp":1760175019000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/11\/2\/23"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,5,19]]},"references-count":37,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,6]]}},"alternative-id":["g11020023"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g11020023","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,5,19]]}}}