{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T03:07:26Z","timestamp":1760238446792,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":47,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,8,7]],"date-time":"2020-08-07T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1596758400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others\u2019 contributions. We present results from a \u201cnaturally noisy\u201d setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert\u2019s voice was \u201clost\u201d to such a degree that bringing forward even more inferior information was optimal. A single individual had little chance to improve the outcome and coordinating with the whole group was impossible. In this setting, we examined the change in behavior before and after people could talk to their neighbors. We found that the number of people who reduced noise by holding back their information strongly and significantly increased.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g11030031","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,8,10]],"date-time":"2020-08-10T07:25:03Z","timestamp":1597044303000},"page":"31","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Against All Odds: Tentative Steps toward Efficient Information Sharing in Groups"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"11","author":[{"given":"Darius","family":"Schlangenotto","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Business Information Systems Department, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Paderborn University, D-33098 Paderborn, Germany"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9073-7310","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Wendelin","family":"Schnedler","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Management Department, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Paderborn University, Warburger Stra\u00dfe 100, D-33098 Paderborn, Germany"},{"name":"Centre for Market and Public Organization, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1QU, UK"},{"name":"Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Schaumburg-Lippe-Stra\u00dfe 5\u20139, 53113 Bonn, Germany"}]},{"given":"Radovan","family":"Vadovi\u010d","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Economics Department, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,8,7]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","first-page":"408","article-title":"The Swing Voter\u2019s Curse","volume":"86","author":"Feddersen","year":"1996","journal-title":"Am. 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