{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,17]],"date-time":"2025-10-17T20:04:05Z","timestamp":1760731445585,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":33,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,6]],"date-time":"2021-05-06T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1620259200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future \u201cwrong-doing\u201d by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking enthusiasm, or soldiers showing cowardice to the enemy. CP could consist of the lockout of workers, additional training units for football teams, increased control of athletes and firms, up to the shooting of fellow villagers of assassins. I investigate two classes of problems. In one class, resistance against an authority is individually costly, but enough resistance can be successful (the production of a public good, for example, higher wages after a strike). In the other case, \u201cresistance\u201d is individually profitable (a criminal activity as pollution) and enough \u201cresistance\u201d produces a public bad. We find that, in the first situation, the announcement of CP never decreases the level of resistance. In the second situation, CP can be successful.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g12020041","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,7]],"date-time":"2021-05-07T22:36:24Z","timestamp":1620426984000},"page":"41","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Deterrence by Collective Punishment May Work against Criminals but Never against Freedom Fighters"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"12","author":[{"given":"Friedel","family":"Bolle","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Business and Economics, European University Viadrina, 15230 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,6]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"3","DOI":"10.1086\/668604","article-title":"Law without the state: Legal attributes and the coordination of decentralized collective punishment","volume":"1","author":"Hadfield","year":"2013","journal-title":"J. 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