{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,25]],"date-time":"2026-04-25T15:43:02Z","timestamp":1777131782907,"version":"3.51.4"},"reference-count":32,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,17]],"date-time":"2021-05-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1621209600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"name":"National Science Foundation","award":["SES-1326584"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["SES-1326584"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms\u2014quantile stable mechanisms\u2014that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g12020043","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,17]],"date-time":"2021-05-17T12:19:57Z","timestamp":1621253997000},"page":"43","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Quantile Stable Mechanisms"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"12","author":[{"given":"Peter","family":"Chen","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Analysis Group, Chicago, IL 60601, USA"}]},{"given":"Michael","family":"Egesdal","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Airbnb, Oakland, CA 94611, USA"}]},{"given":"Marek","family":"Pycia","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Zurich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland"}]},{"given":"M. Bumin","family":"Yenmez","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"47","DOI":"10.2307\/1911460","article-title":"Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching","volume":"52","author":"Roth","year":"1984","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"913","DOI":"10.1257\/0002828054825466","article-title":"Matching with Contracts","volume":"95","author":"Hatfield","year":"2005","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"103","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.28.1.103.14256","article-title":"A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications","volume":"28","author":"Fleiner","year":"2003","journal-title":"Math. Oper. 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