{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,6]],"date-time":"2026-02-06T05:31:23Z","timestamp":1770355883259,"version":"3.49.0"},"reference-count":31,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,10,25]],"date-time":"2021-10-25T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1635120000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We analyze a committee decision in which individuals with common preferences are uncertain which of two alternatives is better for them. Members can acquire costly information. Private signals and information choice are both continuous. As is consistent with Down\u2019s rational ignorance hypothesis, each member acquires less information in a larger committee and tends to acquire zero information when the committee size goes to infinity. However, with more members, a larger committee can gather more aggregate information in equilibrium. The aggregate information is infinite with the size going to infinity if and only if marginal cost at \u201czero information acquisition\u201d is zero. When the marginal cost at \u201czero information acquisition\u201d is positive, the probability of making an appropriate decision tends to be less than one.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g12040079","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,10,25]],"date-time":"2021-10-25T21:44:31Z","timestamp":1635198271000},"page":"79","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["The Condorcet Jury Theorem with Information Acquisition"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"12","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-0146-5910","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jun","family":"Chen","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,10,25]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"De Condorcet, M.J.A.N. (1785). Essai sur l\u2019application de l\u2019analyse \u00e0 la probabilit\u00e9 des d\u00e9cisions rendues \u00e0 la pluralit\u00e9 des voix, L\u2019imprimerie Royale."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"563","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ejpoleco.2005.02.002","article-title":"Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey","volume":"21","author":"Gerling","year":"2005","journal-title":"Eur. J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"24","DOI":"10.1093\/jleo\/19.1.24","article-title":"Jury size and the free rider problem","volume":"19","author":"Mukhopadhaya","year":"2003","journal-title":"J. Law, Econ. Organ."},{"key":"ref_4","first-page":"227","article-title":"A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem","volume":"4","author":"Koriyama","year":"2009","journal-title":"Theor. Econ."},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"36","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2008.02.004","article-title":"Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition","volume":"144","author":"Gershkov","year":"2009","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"436","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2007.06.007","article-title":"Information acquisition in committees","volume":"62","author":"Gerardi","year":"2008","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"165","DOI":"10.1111\/0034-6527.00280","article-title":"Committee design with endogenous information","volume":"71","author":"Persico","year":"2004","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"225","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2005.02.005","article-title":"Would rational voters acquire costly information?","volume":"129","author":"Martinelli","year":"2006","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"315","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-006-0051-4","article-title":"Rational ignorance and voting behavior","volume":"35","author":"Martinelli","year":"2007","journal-title":"Int. J. Game Theory"},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"173","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1756-2171.2008.00060.x","article-title":"Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees","volume":"40","author":"Cai","year":"2009","journal-title":"RAND J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"169","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2013.07.008","article-title":"Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?","volume":"82","author":"Triossi","year":"2013","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.1086\/321018","article-title":"A theory of conservatism","volume":"109","author":"Li","year":"2001","journal-title":"J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"259","DOI":"10.1006\/game.2001.0843","article-title":"A Bayesian model of voting in juries","volume":"37","author":"Duggan","year":"2001","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"359","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-5982.2009.01512.x","article-title":"Viewpoint: Decision-making in committees","volume":"42","author":"Li","year":"2009","journal-title":"Can. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1007","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA6640","article-title":"Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions","volume":"78","author":"Ganuza","year":"2010","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"684","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2016.03.005","article-title":"Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities","volume":"163","author":"Amir","year":"2016","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"84","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9442.2012.01734.x","article-title":"An Incentive-Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem","volume":"115","author":"Laslier","year":"2013","journal-title":"Scand. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_18","unstructured":"Boyer, M., and Kihlstrom, R. (1984). A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information. Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, North-Holland."},{"key":"ref_19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"421","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2001.2960","article-title":"Another look at the Radner\u2013Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information","volume":"107","author":"Chade","year":"2002","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_20","unstructured":"Lindbeck, A., and Weibull, J. (2016). Pay Schemes, Bargaining, and Competition for Talent, unpublished Work."},{"key":"ref_21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"661","DOI":"10.1007\/PL00004205","article-title":"Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets","volume":"18","author":"Hauk","year":"2001","journal-title":"Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_22","unstructured":"Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper Collins."},{"key":"ref_23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"135","DOI":"10.1086\/257897","article-title":"An economic theory of political action in a democracy","volume":"65","author":"Downs","year":"1957","journal-title":"J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2083","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2012.09.006","article-title":"Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits","volume":"147","author":"Krishna","year":"2012","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"185","DOI":"10.1007\/s001990050006","article-title":"Social learning and costly information acquisition","volume":"15","author":"Burguet","year":"2000","journal-title":"Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"121","DOI":"10.1007\/s11238-007-9041-7","article-title":"Better may be worse: Some monotonicity results and paradoxes in discrete choice under uncertainty","volume":"63","author":"Weibull","year":"2007","journal-title":"Theory Decis."},{"key":"ref_27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"34","DOI":"10.2307\/2082796","article-title":"Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem","volume":"90","author":"Banks","year":"1996","journal-title":"Am. Political Sci. Rev."},{"key":"ref_28","first-page":"408","article-title":"The swing voter\u2019s curse","volume":"86","author":"Feddersen","year":"1996","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_29","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1029","DOI":"10.2307\/2171878","article-title":"Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information","volume":"65","author":"Feddersen","year":"1997","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1478","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.91.5.1478","article-title":"Conflicts and common interests in committees","volume":"91","author":"Li","year":"2001","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_31","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"277","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rds026","article-title":"Aggregating information by voting: The wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses","volume":"80","author":"McMurray","year":"2013","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/12\/4\/79\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T07:23:06Z","timestamp":1760167386000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/12\/4\/79"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2021,10,25]]},"references-count":31,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,12]]}},"alternative-id":["g12040079"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g12040079","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2073-4336","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2021,10,25]]}}}