{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T02:38:36Z","timestamp":1760236716966,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":15,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,12,17]],"date-time":"2021-12-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1639699200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm\u2019s private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of collusion. Recent contributions have looked at bilateral information sharing, showing that information sharing is consistent with pairwise stability, This paper studies the networked pattern of bilateral information sharing on market demand, focusing on the role of heterogeneous information (firms\u2019 signals have different variances). We show that while pairwise stability predicts that i.i.d. signals are always shared in groups with a symmetric internal structure (both with and without side-payment and linking costs), heterogeneous signals are shared in asymmetric core-periphery architectures, in which \u201ccore\u201d firms have more valuable information than periphery firms.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g12040095","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,12,20]],"date-time":"2021-12-20T02:40:32Z","timestamp":1639968032000},"page":"95","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Information Sharing in Oligopoly: Sharing Groups and Core-Periphery Architectures"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"12","author":[{"given":"Sergio","family":"Currarini","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Business, University of Leicester, University Rd., Leicester LE1 7RH, UK"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-1305-6583","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Francesco","family":"Feri","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Royal Holloway, University of London, London WC1E 7HU, UK"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,12,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"44","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1996.0108","article-title":"A strategic model of social and economic networks","volume":"71","author":"Jackson","year":"1996","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"71","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(84)90162-5","article-title":"Duopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand","volume":"34","author":"Vives","year":"1985","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"214","DOI":"10.2307\/3003442","article-title":"Fulfilled expectations Cournot duopoly with information acquisition and release","volume":"13","author":"Novshek","year":"1982","journal-title":"Bell J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"383","DOI":"10.2307\/3003640","article-title":"Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing","volume":"14","author":"Clarke","year":"1983","journal-title":"Bell J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"521","DOI":"10.2307\/2555510","article-title":"Cournot oligopoly with information sharing","volume":"16","author":"Li","year":"1985","journal-title":"Rand J. 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Game Theory"},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"455","DOI":"10.2307\/2555968","article-title":"Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The Truth Telling Problem","volume":"24","author":"Ziv","year":"1993","journal-title":"Rand J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1326","DOI":"10.1086\/250099","article-title":"Information Sharing and Competition in the Motor Vehicle Industry","volume":"107","author":"Doyle","year":"1999","journal-title":"J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"305","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-006-0022-9","article-title":"Definitions of Equilibrium in Network Formation Games","volume":"34","author":"Bloch","year":"2006","journal-title":"Int. J. Game Theory"},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"420","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2004.08.004","article-title":"Strongly Stable Networks","volume":"51","author":"Jackson","year":"2005","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"138","DOI":"10.2307\/2555403","article-title":"Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms","volume":"19","author":"Kirby","year":"1988","journal-title":"Rand J. Econom."},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"409","DOI":"10.2307\/2555617","article-title":"Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information and Welfare","volume":"21","author":"Vives","year":"1990","journal-title":"Rand J. 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