{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,12,18]],"date-time":"2025-12-18T14:17:57Z","timestamp":1766067477984,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":12,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,19]],"date-time":"2022-01-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1642550400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Take the fort, then take the city. In a two-stage, two-party contest, victory in the initial stage can provide an advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a Pyrrhic victory. Our main finding is that although the elasticity of effort\u2014which we allow to vary between the two stages\u2014does impact the contestants\u2019 effort levels, it has no bearing on the endogenously determined value of momentum itself. Further, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum. Thus, momentum helps a player solely by enhancing marginal ability for victory in the second-stage contest. It does not, however, change the player\u2019s net calculus of second-stage contest spending. Such contestable advantage is also found to be more rent-dissipative than innate\/uncontestable advantage. Therefore, Pyrrhic victories should be more common for contests with an intermediate stage or stages in which advantages can be earned, ceteris paribus. While intermediate targets appear as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll exists even for backward-inductive equilibrium behavior in a complete information setting. Whereas the quagmire theory suggests parties can become involved in problematic conflicts due to incomplete information, the present paper finds that the setting of conflict\u2014namely, contestable intermediate advantage\u2014can alternatively generate rent-dissipative tolls. Similarly, contestable advantage can lead parties to optimally forego contest participation (i.e., if conflict parameters do not meet the participation constraint). This is in contrast to a one-stage simultaneous contest with second-stage parametric values of the present contest.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g13010012","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,19]],"date-time":"2022-01-19T08:20:57Z","timestamp":1642580457000},"page":"12","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["Conflicts with Momentum"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"13","author":[{"given":"James W.","family":"Boudreau","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Finance, and Quantitative Analysis, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA 30144, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-1204-8365","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Timothy","family":"Mathews","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Finance, and Quantitative Analysis, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA 30144, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Shane D.","family":"Sanders","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Falk College of Sport and Human Dynamics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-7553-4053","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Aniruddha","family":"Bagchi","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Finance, and Quantitative Analysis, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA 30144, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,19]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"59","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.6.3.59","article-title":"Asymmetric Contests with Head Starts and Nonmonotonic Costs","volume":"6","author":"Siegel","year":"2014","journal-title":"Am. Econ. J. Microecon."},{"key":"ref_2","first-page":"177","article-title":"Two-Stage Elimination Contests with Optimal Head Starts","volume":"22","author":"Cohen","year":"2018","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Des."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1435","DOI":"10.3982\/TE3672","article-title":"On the Optimal Design of Biased Contests","volume":"15","author":"Fu","year":"2020","journal-title":"Theor. Econ."},{"unstructured":"Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D., and Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society, Texas A&M University Press.","key":"ref_4"},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"149","DOI":"10.1080\/10242690802221742","article-title":"Raising the cost of rebellion: The role of third-party intervention in intrastate conflict","volume":"20","author":"Chang","year":"2009","journal-title":"Defence Peace Econ."},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"267","DOI":"10.1007\/s11127-018-0567-8","article-title":"Stag Hunt Contests and Alliance Formation","volume":"179","author":"Boudreau","year":"2019","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"283","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01213906","article-title":"Contest Success Functions","volume":"7","author":"Skaperdas","year":"1996","journal-title":"Econ. Theory"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Konrad, K. (2009). Strategy and Dynamics in Contests, Oxford University Press.","key":"ref_8","DOI":"10.1093\/oso\/9780199549597.001.0001"},{"key":"ref_9","first-page":"69","article-title":"The Theory of Contests: A Survey","volume":"11","year":"2007","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Des."},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"536","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0297.00461","article-title":"Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests","volume":"109","author":"Gradstein","year":"1999","journal-title":"Econ. J."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2009.11.005","article-title":"Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result","volume":"94","author":"Alcalde","year":"2010","journal-title":"J. Public Econ."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"59","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-014-0835-x","article-title":"Mixed Equilibria in Tullock Contests","volume":"60","author":"Ewerhart","year":"2015","journal-title":"Econ. Theory"}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/13\/1\/12\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,10]],"date-time":"2025-10-10T22:03:50Z","timestamp":1760133830000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/13\/1\/12"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,19]]},"references-count":12,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,2]]}},"alternative-id":["g13010012"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g13010012","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,19]]}}}