{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,10]],"date-time":"2026-03-10T23:17:12Z","timestamp":1773184632904,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":38,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"6","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,12,13]],"date-time":"2022-12-13T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1670889600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We investigate observed rent dissipation\u2014the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent\u2014in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox\u2014where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable\u2014with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g13060083","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,12,13]],"date-time":"2022-12-13T03:32:32Z","timestamp":1670902352000},"page":"83","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Rent Dissipation in Simple Tullock Contests"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"13","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9386-9036","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Alex","family":"Dickson","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow G4 0QU, UK"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4631-764X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ian A.","family":"MacKenzie","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane 4072, Australia"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-0402-2744","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Petros G.","family":"Sekeris","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Economics and Finance, TBS Business School, Toulouse, 1 Place Jourdain, 31000 Toulouse, France"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,12,13]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D., and Tullock, G. 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