{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,16]],"date-time":"2026-03-16T10:20:53Z","timestamp":1773656453951,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":32,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,12,29]],"date-time":"2022-12-29T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1672272000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"name":"Sapienza University of Rome, Italy"},{"name":"Edgard Milhaud Foundation, Li\u00e8ge, Belgium"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>This paper examines a homogeneous-good Bertrand\u2013Edgeworth oligopoly model to explore the role of firm size and number in pricing. We consider the price impact of merger, break up, investment, divestment, entry and exit. A merger leads to higher prices only when it increases the size of the largest seller and industry capacity is neither too big nor too small post-merger. Similarly, breaking up a firm only leads to lower prices when it concerns the biggest producer and aggregate capacity is within an intermediate range. Investment and entry (weakly) reduce prices, whereas divestment and exit yield (weakly) higher prices. Taken together, these findings suggest that size matters more than number in the determination of oligopoly prices.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g14010003","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,12,30]],"date-time":"2022-12-30T03:18:18Z","timestamp":1672370298000},"page":"3","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"14","author":[{"given":"Iwan","family":"Bos","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Organisation, Strategy and Entrepreneurship, Maastricht University, Minderbroedersberg 4-6, 6211 LK Maastricht, The Netherlands"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-7452-614X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Marco A.","family":"Marini","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Social and Economic Sciences, Sapienza University of Rome, Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5, 00185 Rome, Italy"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,12,29]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","first-page":"111","article-title":"The Pure Theory of Monopoly","volume":"1","author":"Edgeworth","year":"1925","journal-title":"Pap. 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