{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T02:12:14Z","timestamp":1760148734526,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":20,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,2]],"date-time":"2023-06-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1685664000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>In the Crawford\u2013Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that no such simple mediated equilibrium can improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford\u2013Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g14030047","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,2]],"date-time":"2023-06-02T08:50:31Z","timestamp":1685695831000},"page":"47","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"14","author":[{"given":"Chirantan","family":"Ganguly","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Queen\u2019s Management School, Queen\u2019s University Belfast, 185 Stranmillis Road, Belfast BT9 5EE, UK"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-5254-3144","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Indrajit","family":"Ray","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Economics Section, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Colum Drive, Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1431","DOI":"10.2307\/1913390","article-title":"Strategic information transmission","volume":"50","author":"Crawford","year":"1982","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"147","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2003.09.008","article-title":"The art of conversation: Eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication","volume":"117","author":"Krishna","year":"2004","journal-title":"J. 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