{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T02:14:44Z","timestamp":1760148884366,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":22,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,13]],"date-time":"2023-06-13T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1686614400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We consider the design of a contest in which the prize may motivate not only productive efforts, but also some damaging aggressive behavior by contestants. The organizer must choose prizes and an enforcement regime defined as a limit on how much aggressiveness will be tolerated and the probability of inspection. When the value of contestants\u2019 output is low, it may be optimal to motivate much less effort than first best because the prize spread necessary to induce higher effort necessitates a high level of enforcement, which is not worth the cost. On the other hand, when the output value is sufficiently high, it becomes optimal to offer a high prize spread to motivate substantial but still below first-best effort, with costly enforcement then being employed to constrain damaging aggressive behavior. Additionally, a less accurate inspection technology is associated with a tighter limit on aggressive behavior, and \u201czero tolerance\u201d can be optimal if the aggressive behavior has no value.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g14030048","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,14]],"date-time":"2023-06-14T02:01:40Z","timestamp":1686708100000},"page":"48","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Optimal Contest Design When Policing Damaging Behavior"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"14","author":[{"given":"Scott M.","family":"Gilpatric","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Haslam College of Business, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA"}]},{"given":"Ye","family":"Hong","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,13]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"561","DOI":"10.1086\/261616","article-title":"Pay equality and industrial politics","volume":"97","author":"Lazear","year":"1989","journal-title":"J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1145","DOI":"10.1111\/ecin.12410","article-title":"Why Zero Tolerance of Misconduct Is Undesirable in Contests","volume":"55","author":"Gilpatric","year":"2017","journal-title":"Econ. Inq."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"109","DOI":"10.1016\/S0176-2680(01)00071-4","article-title":"The economics of doping","volume":"18","author":"Berentsen","year":"2002","journal-title":"Eur. J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"67","DOI":"10.1177\/1527002503251712","article-title":"The performance-enhancing drug game","volume":"5","author":"Haugen","year":"2004","journal-title":"J. Sports Econ."},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Konrad, K.A. (2005). Tournaments and Multiple Productive Inputs: The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs, IZA Discussion Papers. Technical report.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.857244"},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"723","DOI":"10.2202\/1555-5879.1338","article-title":"Deterrence in rank-order tournaments","volume":"5","author":"Curry","year":"2009","journal-title":"Rev. Law Econ."},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"988","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.003","article-title":"Doping and cheating in contest-like situations","volume":"23","year":"2007","journal-title":"Eur. J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1042","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1465-7295.2010.00244.x","article-title":"Cheating in contests","volume":"49","author":"Gilpatric","year":"2011","journal-title":"Econ. Inq."},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"736","DOI":"10.1177\/1527002514542438","article-title":"Cheating in contests: Anti-doping regulatory problems in sport","volume":"17","author":"Mohan","year":"2016","journal-title":"J. Sports Econ."},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"281","DOI":"10.1177\/1527002519885425","article-title":"The undesirable consequences of doping regulations: Why stricter efforts might strengthen doping incentives","volume":"21","author":"Music","year":"2020","journal-title":"J. Sports Econ."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"169","DOI":"10.1086\/259394","article-title":"Crime and punishment: An economic approach","volume":"76","author":"Becker","year":"1968","journal-title":"J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"259","DOI":"10.1086\/467485","article-title":"The deterrent effect of criminal law enforcement","volume":"1","author":"Ehrlich","year":"1972","journal-title":"J. Leg. Stud."},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"45","DOI":"10.1257\/jel.38.1.45","article-title":"The economic theory of public enforcement of law","volume":"38","author":"Polinsky","year":"2000","journal-title":"J. Econ. Lit."},{"key":"ref_14","unstructured":"Newbery, E. An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, Available online: https:\/\/archive.org\/details\/essayoncrimespun00becc\/page\/86\/mode\/2up."},{"key":"ref_15","unstructured":"Dodesley, P. (1767). The Spirit of Laws, Printed for J. Almon, opposite Burlington-House, Piccadilly. Available online: https:\/\/catalog.hathitrust.org\/Record\/008603896."},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bentham, J. (1996). The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Clarendon Press.","DOI":"10.1093\/actrade\/9780198205166.book.1"},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"526","DOI":"10.1086\/259646","article-title":"The optimum enforcement of laws","volume":"78","author":"Stigler","year":"1970","journal-title":"J. Political Econ."},{"key":"ref_18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"333","DOI":"10.1016\/0144-8188(92)90012-G","article-title":"Criminal choice, nonmonetary sanctions, and marginal deterrence: A normative analysis","volume":"12","author":"Wilde","year":"1992","journal-title":"Int. Rev. Law Econ."},{"key":"ref_19","first-page":"556","article-title":"Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law","volume":"3","author":"Mookherjee","year":"1992","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"345","DOI":"10.1016\/0144-8188(92)90013-H","article-title":"A note on marginal deterrence","volume":"12","author":"Shavell","year":"1992","journal-title":"Int. Rev. Law Econ."},{"key":"ref_21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"345","DOI":"10.1086\/468168","article-title":"Hanged for a sheep: The economics of marginal deterrence","volume":"22","author":"Friedman","year":"1993","journal-title":"J. Leg. Stud."},{"key":"ref_22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1039","DOI":"10.1086\/261963","article-title":"Marginal deterrence in enforcement of law","volume":"102","author":"Mookherjee","year":"1994","journal-title":"J. Political Econ."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/14\/3\/48\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,10]],"date-time":"2025-10-10T19:54:08Z","timestamp":1760126048000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/14\/3\/48"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,13]]},"references-count":22,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,6]]}},"alternative-id":["g14030048"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g14030048","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,13]]}}}