{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T02:23:01Z","timestamp":1760149381846,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":31,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,7,28]],"date-time":"2023-07-28T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1690502400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff\u2019s probability of winning the contest.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g14040055","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,7,28]],"date-time":"2023-07-28T07:58:52Z","timestamp":1690531132000},"page":"55","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Asymmetric Reimbursement and Contingent Fees in Environmental Conflicts: Observable vs. Unobservable Contracts"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"14","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3949-002X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Sung-Hoon","family":"Park","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Chosun University, 309 Philmoondaero, Dong-gu, Gwangju 61452, Republic of Korea"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Chad E.","family":"Settle","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Tulsa, 800 S. Tucker Drive, Tulsa, OK 74104, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,7,28]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1006\/jeem.1994.1022","article-title":"Environmental Conflicts with Reimbursement of Citizen Suits","volume":"27","author":"Baik","year":"1994","journal-title":"J. Environ. Econ. Manag."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Wessler, J., Weikard, H.-P., and Weaver, R.D. (2004). Risk and Uncertainty in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, Cheltenham.","DOI":"10.4337\/9781035335718"},{"key":"ref_3","first-page":"3224","article-title":"Environmental Conflicts with Reimbursement: Experimental Evidence","volume":"32","author":"Cherry","year":"2012","journal-title":"Econ. 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