{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T00:57:40Z","timestamp":1760144260679,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":22,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,30]],"date-time":"2024-03-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1711756800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>A variety of empirical papers document the coexistence of exclusive and nonexclusive contracts within a given market across a multitude of industries. However, the theoretical literature has not been able to generate a differentiable model with the coexistence of these contracts. I rectify the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model of two-sided matching, in which principals and agents choose between exclusive and nonexclusive contracts with cost-of-effort inefficiencies. I find that the coexistence of contracts relies on cost-sharing between principals, relative bargaining power, and an endogenous outside option. I also find that the pattern of contracts is monotonic with respect to the type distributions of principals and agents.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g15020011","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,31]],"date-time":"2024-03-31T13:28:00Z","timestamp":1711891680000},"page":"11","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Matching with Nonexclusive Contracts"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"15","author":[{"given":"Daniel","family":"Ripperger-Suhler","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 4600 Silver Hill Road, Suitland, MD 20746, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,30]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"64","DOI":"10.1086\/467004","article-title":"Exclusive Dealing","volume":"25","author":"Marvel","year":"1982","journal-title":"J. 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