{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T01:11:38Z","timestamp":1760145098878,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":31,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,20]],"date-time":"2024-06-20T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1718841600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"name":"Guangdong University of Science and Technology","award":["(GKXY)LX-DXFY-C-2024003"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["(GKXY)LX-DXFY-C-2024003"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>In this paper, we aim to investigate the collusive stability in the presence of network externalities among firms with relative performance in the firm\u2019s objective functions. We demonstrate that collusive stability is increasing (decreasing) in the degree of relative performance, product substitutability and network effect when the network effect is sufficiently large (small). A competition agency might need to provide different guidance for anti-competitive regulation in the network industry.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g15030021","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,20]],"date-time":"2024-06-20T03:46:29Z","timestamp":1718855189000},"page":"21","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Collusive Stability with Relative Performance and Network Externalities"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"15","author":[{"given":"Yi-Shan","family":"Lu","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Logistics Management, Guangdong University of Science and Technology, Dongguan 523083, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-5767-4079","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Chien-Shu","family":"Tsai","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Marine Affairs and Business Management, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung 811213, Taiwan"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9943-5084","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jen-Yao","family":"Lee","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of International Business, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung 807618, Taiwan"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0008-4405-3004","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Chung-Yang","family":"Lee","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of International Business, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung 807618, Taiwan"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.2307\/2296617","article-title":"A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames","volume":"38","author":"Friedman","year":"1971","journal-title":"Rev. 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