{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T01:25:33Z","timestamp":1760145933042,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":32,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"5","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,11]],"date-time":"2024-09-11T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1726012800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on a continuous type space. Types are privately informed, but they become public together with actions when payoffs are obtained, resulting in a delayed information revelation. In this environment, I show that there exists a stationary Bayesian\u2013Markov equilibrium in which a player\u2019s strategy maps a tuple of the previous type and action profiles and the player\u2019s current type to a mixed action. The existence can be extended to K-periodic revelation. I also offer a computational algorithm to find an equilibrium.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g15050031","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,12]],"date-time":"2024-09-12T02:30:23Z","timestamp":1726108223000},"page":"31","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Stationary Bayesian\u2013Markov Equilibria in Bayesian Stochastic Games with Periodic Revelation"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"15","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-7280-5815","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Eunmi","family":"Ko","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, 92 Lomb Memorial Dr, Rochester, NY 14623, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,11]]},"reference":[{"unstructured":"Saxe, J.G. (1873). The Blind Men and the Elephant, James R. 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