{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,7]],"date-time":"2025-11-07T05:19:03Z","timestamp":1762492743102,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":18,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"6","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,5]],"date-time":"2025-11-05T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1762300800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player\u2019s contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g16060058","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,5]],"date-time":"2025-11-05T16:09:47Z","timestamp":1762358987000},"page":"58","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments\u2014Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"16","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-0442-8077","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jobst","family":"Heitzig","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam, Germany"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,5]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Aumann, R. J. (1959). Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. Contributions to the theory of games, Princeton University Press.","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400882168-018"},{"key":"ref_2","unstructured":"Barrett, S. (1994). Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Available online: http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2663505."},{"key":"ref_3","first-page":"241","article-title":"State coordination in popular election of the president without a constitutional amendment","volume":"4","author":"Bennett","year":"2001","journal-title":"Green Bag"},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(87)90099-8","article-title":"Coalition-proof nash equilibria I. 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