{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,13]],"date-time":"2026-02-13T04:27:38Z","timestamp":1770956858700,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":37,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2012,9,13]],"date-time":"2012-09-13T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1347494400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement occurs even if all experimentally controlled information is common knowledge. This paper rationalizes both regularities coherently by modeling heterogeneous social preferences, either self-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and signaling.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g3030119","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,9,13]],"date-time":"2012-09-13T12:26:52Z","timestamp":1347539212000},"page":"119-137","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"3","author":[{"given":"Stefan","family":"Kohler","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute for Social Medicine, Epidemiology and Health Economics, Charit\u00e9 University Medical Center, Luisenstrae 57, 10117 Berlin, Germany"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,9,13]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"St\u00e5hl, I. (1972). Bargaining Theory, Stockholm School of Economics."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"97","DOI":"10.2307\/1912531","article-title":"Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model","volume":"50","author":"Rubinstein","year":"1982","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_3","first-page":"1096","article-title":"A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence","volume":"81","author":"Bolton","year":"1991","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_4","first-page":"355","article-title":"An experimental study of sequential bargaining","volume":"79","author":"Ochs","year":"1989","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"76","DOI":"10.1016\/0899-8256(90)90015-M","article-title":"Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon","volume":"2","author":"Weg","year":"1990","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_6","unstructured":"Camerer, C.F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction (The Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics), Princeton University Press."},{"key":"ref_7","unstructured":"Kagel, J.H., and Roth, A.E. Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press."},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Smith, R. (2008). Envy: Theory and Research, Oxford University Press.","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780195327953.001.0001"},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"175","DOI":"10.2307\/2297510","article-title":"Bargaining with two-sided incomplete information: An infinite horizon model with alternating offers","volume":"54","author":"Chatterjee","year":"1987","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"605","DOI":"10.1287\/opre.36.4.605","article-title":"Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information: The unrestricted offers case","volume":"36","author":"Chatterjee","year":"1988","journal-title":"Oper. Res."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"205","DOI":"10.2307\/2297934","article-title":"Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty","volume":"59","author":"Cramton","year":"1992","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"120","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(86)90023-2","article-title":"Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information","volume":"39","author":"Grossman","year":"1986","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"601","DOI":"10.2307\/1911702","article-title":"On delay in bargaining with one-sided uncertainty","volume":"56","author":"Gul","year":"1988","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1151","DOI":"10.2307\/1911016","article-title":"A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences","volume":"53","author":"Rubinstein","year":"1985","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"579","DOI":"10.2307\/2297780","article-title":"Bargaining with incomplete information: An infinite-horizon model with two-sided uncertainty","volume":"51","author":"Cramton","year":"1984","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Roth, A.E. (1985). Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press.","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511528309"},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"411","DOI":"10.2307\/2297673","article-title":"A multistage model of bargaining","volume":"50","author":"Sobel","year":"1983","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"ref_18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"18","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(89)90118-X","article-title":"A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information","volume":"48","author":"Ausubel","year":"1989","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1897","DOI":"10.1016\/S1574-0005(02)03013-8","article-title":"Bargaining with Incomplete Information","volume":"3","author":"Aumann","year":"2002","journal-title":"Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications"},{"key":"ref_20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Kagel, J.H., and Roth, A.E. (1995). Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.","DOI":"10.1515\/9780691213255"},{"key":"ref_21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"178","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2011.09.027","article-title":"Bargaining and inequity aversion: On the efficiency of the double auction","volume":"114","author":"Rasch","year":"2012","journal-title":"Econ. Lett."},{"key":"ref_22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"166","DOI":"10.1006\/obhd.2000.2936","article-title":"The role of inferences in sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information: Some experimental evidence","volume":"85","author":"Srivastava","year":"2001","journal-title":"Org. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process."},{"key":"ref_23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"486","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2009.02.007","article-title":"Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem","volume":"71","year":"2009","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Org."},{"key":"ref_24","first-page":"499","article-title":"Heterogeneous social preferences, screening, and employment contracts","volume":"63","year":"2010","journal-title":"Oxf. Econ. Papers"},{"key":"ref_25","first-page":"1774","article-title":"Estimating the influence of fairness on bargaining behavior","volume":"54","author":"Bolton","year":"2008","journal-title":"Manag. Sci."},{"key":"ref_26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1079","DOI":"10.1016\/S0014-2921(99)00048-3","article-title":"Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games","volume":"44","author":"Goeree","year":"2000","journal-title":"Eur. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"166","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.90.1.166","article-title":"ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition","volume":"90","author":"Bolton","year":"2000","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"817","DOI":"10.1162\/003355399556151","article-title":"A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation","volume":"114","author":"Fehr","year":"1999","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_29","unstructured":"Kohler, S. (2012). MPRA Paper 40761, University Library of Munich."},{"key":"ref_30","unstructured":"Kohler, S. (2012). MPRA Paper 40760, University Library of Munich."},{"key":"ref_31","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"103","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.010","article-title":"Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion","volume":"64","author":"Driesen","year":"2011","journal-title":"Math. Soc. Sci."},{"key":"ref_32","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"C192","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0297.2007.02041.x","article-title":"Inequity aversion may increase inequity","volume":"117","author":"Montero","year":"2007","journal-title":"Econ. J."},{"key":"ref_33","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"101","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2011.02.014","article-title":"Altruism and fairness in experimental decisions","volume":"80","author":"Kohler","year":"2011","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Org."},{"key":"ref_34","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"35","DOI":"10.1007\/s11238-005-4752-0","article-title":"On the relative strengths of altruism and fairness","volume":"60","author":"Tan","year":"2006","journal-title":"Theory Decis."},{"key":"ref_35","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.2307\/1914185","article-title":"Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk","volume":"47","author":"Kahneman","year":"1979","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_36","unstructured":"Myerson, R.B. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press."},{"key":"ref_37","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"85","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00094","article-title":"Bargaining and reputation","volume":"68","author":"Abreu","year":"2000","journal-title":"Econometrica"}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/3\/3\/119\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T21:52:20Z","timestamp":1760219540000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/3\/3\/119"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2012,9,13]]},"references-count":37,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,9]]}},"alternative-id":["g3030119"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g3030119","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2073-4336","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2012,9,13]]}}}