{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T22:12:12Z","timestamp":1760220732995,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":19,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2013,4,26]],"date-time":"2013-04-26T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1366934400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our experiments, participants can locate their contribution, yielding a small benefit for the participant, who receives the contribution and a small disadvantage for the participant, at the opposite location. This mechanism of individually targeted sanctions helps to foster initial cooperation. It decreases over time, however. Location choices are used to reciprocate, but may not suffice to stabilize voluntary cooperation as an effect observed in the field.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g4020144","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,4,26]],"date-time":"2013-04-26T11:27:28Z","timestamp":1366975648000},"page":"144-162","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Reciprocity in Locating Contributions: Experiments on the Neighborhood Public Good Game"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"4","author":[{"given":"Siegfried","family":"Berninghaus","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Economic Theory and Statistics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Zirkel 2, Karlsruhe, Germany"}]},{"given":"Werner","family":"G\u00fcth","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Strasse 10, Jena,Germany"}]},{"given":"Stephan","family":"Schosser","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Social Medicine and Health Economics, University of Magdeburg, Leipziger Strasse 44, Magdeburg, Germany"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,4,26]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"291","DOI":"10.1016\/0047-2727(88)90043-6","article-title":"Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments","volume":"37","author":"Andreoni","year":"1988","journal-title":"J. Public. Econ."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"47","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-010-9257-1","article-title":"Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: A selective survey of the literature","volume":"14","author":"Chaudhuri","year":"2011","journal-title":"Experimental Econ."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"113","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00140829","article-title":"Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations","volume":"43","author":"Isaac","year":"1984","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"397","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-1765(01)00394-9","article-title":"Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment","volume":"71","author":"Fischbacher","year":"2001","journal-title":"Econ. Lett."},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"541","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.100.1.541","article-title":"Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public goods experiments","volume":"100","author":"Fischbacher","year":"2010","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1803","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0408759102","article-title":"Experiments investigating cooperative types inhumans: A complement to evolutionary theoryand simulations","volume":"102","author":"Kurzban","year":"2005","journal-title":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences"},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"137","DOI":"10.1038\/415137a","article-title":"Altruistic punishment in humans","volume":"415","author":"Fehr","year":"2002","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"980","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.90.4.980","article-title":"Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments","volume":"90","author":"Fehr","year":"2000","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_9","unstructured":"Fischer, S., Grechening, K., and Meier, N. (2012)."},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"348","DOI":"10.1038\/nature06723","article-title":"Winners don\u2019t punish","volume":"452","author":"Dreber","year":"2008","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1362","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1153808","article-title":"Antisocial punishment across societies","volume":"319","author":"Herrmann","year":"2008","journal-title":"Science (New York, N.Y.)"},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"871","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2007.1558","article-title":"The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation","volume":"275","author":"Egas","year":"2008","journal-title":"Proceedings of the Royal Society\/Biological Sciences"},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"358","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-007-9171-3","article-title":"A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments","volume":"11","author":"Nikiforakis","year":"2008","journal-title":"Experimental Econ."},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"671","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x","article-title":"The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods","volume":"45","author":"Sefton","year":"2007","journal-title":"Econ. Inq."},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1272","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1177418","article-title":"Positive interactions promote public cooperation","volume":"325","author":"Rand","year":"2009","journal-title":"Science (New York, N.Y.)"},{"key":"ref_16","unstructured":"Greiner, B. (2004)."},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-006-9159-4","article-title":"z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments","volume":"10","author":"Fischbacher","year":"2007","journal-title":"Experimental Econ."},{"key":"ref_18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"23","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-9442.00182","article-title":"Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods","volume":"102","author":"Keser","year":"2000","journal-title":"Scand. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_19","first-page":"1","article-title":"Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to a public good","volume":"3","author":"Chaudhuri","year":"2006","journal-title":"Econ. Bull."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/4\/2\/144\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T21:46:23Z","timestamp":1760219183000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/4\/2\/144"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2013,4,26]]},"references-count":19,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,6]]}},"alternative-id":["g4020144"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g4020144","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2013,4,26]]}}}