{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T04:31:51Z","timestamp":1760243511623,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":19,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]],"date-time":"2013-08-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1375401600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching an agreement that incorporates the (unrealized) costs of delay and conflict. A laboratory experiment has been used to investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by conflict with a random outcome. Observed demands at each stage are significantly correlated with power, as measured by the probability of winning in the event of disagreement. Demand patterns, however, are flatter than theoretical predictions, and conflict occurs in a significant proportion of the interactions, regardless of the degree of the power asymmetry. To address these deviations from the standard game-theoretic predictions, we also estimated a logit quantal response model, which generated the qualitative patterns that are observed in the data. This one-parameter generalization of the Nash equilibrium permits a deconstruction of the strategic incentives that cause demands to be less responsive to power asymmetries than Nash predictions.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g4030375","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]],"date-time":"2013-08-02T11:56:22Z","timestamp":1375444582000},"page":"375-397","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":6,"title":["An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in  Conflict Bargaining"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"4","author":[{"given":"Katri","family":"Sieberg","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Social Science and Humanities, FIN-33014 University of Tampere, Finland"}]},{"given":"David","family":"Clark","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Political Science, Binghamton University (SUNY), Binghamton, NY 13902, USA"}]},{"given":"Charles","family":"Holt","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Virginia. Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA"}]},{"given":"Timothy","family":"Nordstrom","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Political Science, The University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS 38677, USA"}]},{"given":"William","family":"Reed","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Government & Politics, University of Maryland, 3140 Tydings Hall, College Park,  MD 20742, USA"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"48","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2001.2910","article-title":"A backward induction experiment","volume":"104","author":"Binmore","year":"2002","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_2","first-page":"837","article-title":"A further test of noncooperative bargaining theory: A reply","volume":"78","author":"Binmore","year":"1988","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/0749-5978(87)90043-4","article-title":"Experimental comparison of individual behavior under risk and under uncertainty for gains and for losses","volume":"39","author":"Cohen","year":"1987","journal-title":"Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Davis, D., and Holt, C. (1993). Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.","key":"ref_4","DOI":"10.1515\/9780691233376"},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"379","DOI":"10.1017\/S0020818300033324","article-title":"Rationalist explanations for war","volume":"49","author":"Fearon","year":"1995","journal-title":"Int. Organ."},{"unstructured":"Fr\u00e9chette, G.R., and Schotter, A. The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.","key":"ref_6"},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"347","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-005-5374-7","article-title":"Regular quantal response equilibrium","volume":"8","author":"Goeree","year":"2006","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1079","DOI":"10.1016\/S0014-2921(99)00048-3","article-title":"Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games","volume":"44","author":"Goeree","year":"2000","journal-title":"Eur. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"367","DOI":"10.1016\/0167-2681(82)90011-7","article-title":"An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining","volume":"3","author":"Schmittberger","year":"1982","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"3999","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0308738101","article-title":"The Nash equilibrium: A perspective","volume":"101","author":"Holt","year":"2004","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"263","DOI":"10.2307\/1914185","article-title":"Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk","volume":"47","author":"Kahneman","year":"1979","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"6","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1995.1023","article-title":"Quantal response equilibrium for normal form games","volume":"10","author":"McKelvey","year":"1995","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"ref_13","first-page":"824","article-title":"A further test of noncooperative bargaining theory: Comment","volume":"78","author":"Neelin","year":"1988","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"255","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1996.0068","article-title":"Bargaining in the shadow of power","volume":"15","author":"Powell","year":"1996","journal-title":"GamesEcon. Behav."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Powell, R. (1999). Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics, Princeton University Press.","key":"ref_15","DOI":"10.1515\/9780691213989"},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"65","DOI":"10.1257\/0022051053737816","article-title":"Economic theory and experimental economics","volume":"43","author":"Samuelson","year":"2005","journal-title":"J. Econ. Lit."},{"unstructured":"Siegel, S., and Castellan, J. (1988). Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, McGraw-Hill.","key":"ref_17"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Tomz, M., and Weeks, J. (2013). Public opinion and the democratic peace. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.","key":"ref_18","DOI":"10.1017\/S0003055413000488"},{"key":"ref_19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"705","DOI":"10.1177\/0022002799043006002","article-title":"Choosing demands strategically: The distribution of power, the distribution of benefits, and the risk of conflict","volume":"43","author":"Werner","year":"1999","journal-title":"J. Confl. Resolut."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/4\/3\/375\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T21:48:23Z","timestamp":1760219303000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/4\/3\/375"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]]},"references-count":19,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,9]]}},"alternative-id":["g4030375"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g4030375","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]]}}}