{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T04:32:18Z","timestamp":1760243538011,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":12,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,30]],"date-time":"2013-08-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1377820800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly,  the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where  no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g4030497","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,30]],"date-time":"2013-08-30T13:20:35Z","timestamp":1377868835000},"page":"497-507","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":7,"title":["Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"4","author":[{"given":"Ola","family":"Andersson","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Grevgatan 34, Stockholm 102 15, Sweden"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Hakan","family":"Holm","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. 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Organizational Coordination with Decentralized Costly Communication, Carnegie Mellon University. unpublished."},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"113","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00140829","article-title":"Divergent evidence on free-riding: an experimental examination of different explanations","volume":"43","author":"Isaac","year":"1984","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"585","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01519.x","article-title":"Communication and free-riding behavior: The voluntary contribution mechanism","volume":"26","author":"Isaac","year":"1988","journal-title":"Econ. Inq."},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"477","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ijindorg.2009.11.003","article-title":"Endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market entry games \u2014 an explorative experimental study","volume":"28","author":"Andersson","year":"2010","journal-title":"Int. J. Ind. 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