{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,6]],"date-time":"2025-11-06T06:03:14Z","timestamp":1762408994255,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":20,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2013,11,27]],"date-time":"2013-11-27T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1385510400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g4040738","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,11,27]],"date-time":"2013-11-27T14:43:20Z","timestamp":1385563400000},"page":"738-753","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":6,"title":["Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"4","author":[{"given":"Jason","family":"Shachat","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) and the MOE Key Laboratory in Econometrics, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, China"}]},{"given":"J.","family":"Swarthout","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,11,27]]},"reference":[{"unstructured":"Camerer, C.F. 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Econ."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/4\/4\/738\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T21:50:56Z","timestamp":1760219456000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/4\/4\/738"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2013,11,27]]},"references-count":20,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,12]]}},"alternative-id":["g4040738"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g4040738","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2013,11,27]]}}}