{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T19:54:08Z","timestamp":1760298848410,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":42,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2013,12,18]],"date-time":"2013-12-18T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1387324800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>In this paper, we claim that agents confronting with new interactive situations apply behavioral heuristics that drastically reduce the problem complexity either by neglecting the other players\u2019 incentives, or by restricting attention to subsets of \u201csalient\u201d outcomes. We postulate that these heuristics are sensitive to the manipulation of those features that can be modified without altering the (Nash) equilibrium structure of the game. We call these features \u201cdescriptive\u201d. We test experimentally the effect of these descriptive features on both choice behavior and cross-game similarity perception. Analysis of individual choices confirms our hypotheses, and suggests that non-equilibrium choices may derive from simplified mental models of the game structure, rather than from heterogeneous beliefs or limited iterative thinking. In addition, subjects tend to behave similarly in games sharing similar descriptive features, regardless of their strategic structure.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g4040776","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,12,18]],"date-time":"2013-12-18T14:55:38Z","timestamp":1387378538000},"page":"776-794","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":15,"title":["Feature-Based Choice and Similarity Perception in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"4","author":[{"given":"Sibilla","family":"Di Guida","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics, Universit\u00e9 Libre de Bruxelles, Avenue Roosevelt 50 CP 114, Bruxelles 1050, Belgium"}]},{"given":"Giovanna","family":"Devetag","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Luiss Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management, Viale Pola 12, Roma 00198, Italy"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,12,18]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"6","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1995.1023","article-title":"Quantal response equilibrium for normal form games","volume":"10","author":"McKelvey","year":"1995","journal-title":"Games Econ. 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