{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,20]],"date-time":"2026-02-20T07:33:32Z","timestamp":1771572812468,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":41,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2015,11,3]],"date-time":"2015-11-03T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1446508800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100002428","name":"Austrian Science Fund","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["P27018-G11"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["P27018-G11"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100002428","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001691","name":"Japan Society for the Promotion of Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["26330387"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["26330387"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001691","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001809","name":"National Natural Science Foundation of China","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["61503062 and 61203374"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["61503062 and 61203374"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001809","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and pool punishment for sanctioning free riders separately. However, these sanctioning mechanisms often pose a puzzling tradeoff between efficiency and stability in detecting and punishing free riders. Here, we combine the key aspects of these qualitatively different mechanisms in terms of evolutionary game theory. Based on the dilemmatic donation game, we introduce a strategy of commitment to both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make a certain deposit. The deposit will be refunded as long as the committers faithfully cooperate in the donation game and punish free riders and non-committers. It turns out that the deposit-based commitment offers both the efficiency of peer punishment and the stability of pool punishment and that the replicator dynamics lead to transitions of different systems: pool punishment to commitment to peer punishment.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g6040574","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2015,11,3]],"date-time":"2015-11-03T11:17:07Z","timestamp":1446549427000},"page":"574-587","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":47,"title":["Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"6","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4635-1389","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Tatsuya","family":"Sasaki","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Vienna 1090, Austria"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Isamu","family":"Okada","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Business Administration, Soka University, Tokyo 192-8577, Japan"},{"name":"Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna 1020, Austria"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Satoshi","family":"Uchida","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Research Center, RINRI Institute, Tokyo 101-8385, Japan"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Xiaojie","family":"Chen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2015,11,3]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"Maynard Smith, J., and Szathm\u00e1ry, E. 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